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I. INTRODUCTION
MERCOSUR, the "Common Market of the Southern Cone," was created
in March 1990 by the Treaty of Asunci6n and was meant to create a common
market among its four signatories (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay)
by December 31, 1994.' This common market would include the graduated
elimination of all customs duties among its signatories,2 the creation of a
common external tariff, the adoption of a common trade policy,3 and the
harmonization of economic policies The Treaty of Asunci6n, and its
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' Treaty of Asunci6n Establishing a Common Market among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay,
Uruguay, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041 [hereinafter Asunci6n].
2 Id. art. 5(a), Annex 1 (7).
Id. arts. 1, 5(c).
4 Id. arts. 2, 5(b).
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
supplementary Ouro Preto Protocol,5 created a number of institutions to assist
in the implementation of these goals.6
Since its founding in 1990, MERCOSUR has generated many major
achievements, more than its predecessor, the Latin American Free Trade
Association (LAFTA)7 or any other economic integration organization in Latin
America. It has formalized and expanded cooperation and trading relation-
ships among Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, and has developed
these relationships into a viable and vibrant economic integration organization.
For a substantial period of time, its members enjoyed unprecedented expanded
trade and greater prosperity. Trade and exports among its member states have
increased exponentially.' It became the third-largest trading block in the
world, after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the
European Union (EU).9
In 1996, the international press described MERCOSUR as a powerhouse
and a potential future competitor to the EU and NAFrA.'0 MERCOSUR
seemed to be on its way to becoming "the Common Market of the Twenty-First
Century."
Institutionally, MERCOSUR agreed on a common external tariff covering
eighty-five percent of imports currently being traded by its members" and on
a substantial number of trade matters. It has adopted many directives and
resolutions seeking to eliminate barriers to free trade and to harmonize the
legal and regulatory systems of the member states, as well as to form the basis
of a system of community law.' 2  It generated a substantial amount of
Argentina-Brasil-Paraguay-Uruguay: Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asunci6n on
the Institutional Structure of Mercosur ("Protocol of Ouro Preto"), Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M.
1244 [hereinafter Ouro Preto].
6 See supra notes 1, 5 and accompanying text.
Treaty Establishing a Free-Trade Area and Instituting the Latin American Free Trade
Association, Feb. 18, 1960, 1484 U.N.T.S. 223 [hereinafter 1960 Treaty].
' Michael S. Serrill, Keep it in the Neighborhood Forget NAFTA-South America is Busy
Building its own Powerful Trading Bloc, Called MERCOSUR, TIME INT'L, Aug. 26, 1996, at 26
[hereinafter Keep it in the Neighborhood].
9 Matt Moffett & Craig Torres, Brazil andArgentina, Long Rivals, Move Closer, WALLST.
J., Nov. 12, 1998, at A25 [hereinafter Rivals].
'o See Keep it in the Neighborhood, supra note 8.
" Antoni Estevadeordal & Ekaternia Krivonos, Negotiating Market Access Between the
European Union and MERCOSUR: Issues and Prospects, Institute for Integration of Latin
America and the Caribbean (INTAL) and the Integration, Trade and Hemispheric Issues Division
(ITD) Occasional Paper 7 (2000), available at http:/www.iadb.orglintal/publicaciones/
Estevadeordal-KrivonosOP7.pdf [hereinafter Negotiating Market Access].
2 See http://www.mercosur.org.uy/espanollsnor/normativallisdir.htm (last visited Dec. 7,
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excitement among the elites of its members states, who now seem to view the
idea of economic integration as both feasible and desirable. It acquired two
additional members, Bolivia and Chile, in 1996,13 and entered into an extensive
and substantial cooperative relationship with the EU, as well as with a number
of other organizations and countries.' 4 It has an agenda for the future and is
working towards its implementation.' 5 Commentators in the member states
had been talking about more integration, macroeconomic policy harmoniza-
tion, and even a single currency.'
6
This optimistic environment has changed since 1999. Severe economic
difficulties since 1999, first in Brazil, then in Argentina and the other member
states, have had a dramatic effect on MERCOSUR and its development.
Argentina felt the need to become protectionist in its trade relations with
Brazil, and immediately imposed import quotas for textiles and extensive
technical requirements for imported electrical appliances, and asserted that it
was considering the imposition of "safeguards" against imported shoes and
paper.'7 Brazil started negotiations and reached a trade agreement with the
2003).
" The agreement with Chile was executed on June 26, 1996, at San Luis, Argentina.
Acuerdo de Complementaci6n Econ6mica Mercosur-Chile, ACE No. 35 (6/25/96), available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/msch/Acuerdo.asp [hereinafter Chile Agreement]; Acuerdo de
Complementaci6n Econ6mica No. 36, Dec. 17, 1996, available at http:/www.sice.oas.org/trade/
mrcsbo/MERBOlS.asp [hereinafter Bolivia Agreement].
14 See infra notes 261-313, 455-69.
IS See Comunicado del 15 de Diciembre de 2000, Florian6polis, available at http://www.
mercosur.org.uy/espanol/snor/varios/comO2OO.htm, at para. 9 [hereinafter Florian6polis];
Comunicado del 30 de Junio de 2000, Buenos Aires, available at http://www.mercosur.org.
uy/espanol/snor/verios/comOlOO.htm [hereinafter Buenos Aires]; Comunicado del 8 de
Diciembre de 1999, Montevideo, available at http:lwww.mercosur.org.uylespanollsnor/varios/
com0299.htm, at para. 11 [hereinafter Montevideo].
36 See Florian6polis, supra note 15, at para. 7.
'7 Peter Fritsch, Brazil Tie to Argentina at Breaking Point, WA.L ST. J., July 28, 1999, at
A20 [hereinafter Breaking Point]; Sour Mercosur, ECONOMIST, Aug. 14, 1999, at 13. A
commentator noted, however, that this crisis should actually strengthen MERCOSUR in the long
run because: a) this crisis had happened before; b) this crisis has made Argentina and Brazil
understand how important it is to coordinate macroeconomic policy and to strengthen and create
a formal liaison mechanism between them (with MERCOSUR being the perfect candidate for
such a mechanism) and c) the way the crisis was handled shows that centuries of political distrust
and hostility have been substantially eroded. Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, Crisis to Solidify
MERCOSUR, J. COM., Mar. 9,1999, at 5A.
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Andean countries.'8 By the end of the year, relations between Argentina and
Brazil were said to be "at a breaking point."' 9
The poor relationship between MERCOSUR's major partners continued
throughout 2000 and 2001. Argentina viewed MERCOSUR as detrimental to
its economy, and its government became uncooperative in MERCOSUR
matters.2° A number of disputes among the member states surfaced in the
Mercosur Common Market Group2 caused by an energy crisis, fears of a debt
default, and political squabbles, creating a similar situation in Argentina. In the
meantime, Chile suspended talks on full membership in MERCOSUR and
announced that it was entering into free trade negotiations with the United
States, and subsequently entering into a free trade agreement. 22 With the
Argentine "meltdown" of 2001-2002, the picture for MERCOSUR looked
much grimmer. To make matters worse, it faces a hemispheric competitor, the
United States-sponsored Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), a
multilateral, comprehensive free trade agreement treaty to be entered into
among the thirty-four nations that attended the First Summit of the Americas
in 1994.23 Negotiations on a draft FTAA agreement started in June 199824 and
are meant to be concluded no later than January 2005, with the treaty coming
into effect no later than December 2005.25 MERCOSUR might not be the
18 Breaking Point, supra note 17.
19 Id.
20 Craig Torres & Matt Moffett, Neighbor-Bashing: Argentina Cries Foul as Choice
Employers Beat a Path Next Door, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2000, at Al [hereinafter Neighbor-
Bashing].
21 See INFoRME DEL GRUPO MERCADO COMON ALCONSEJO MERCADO COM1N-PRESlDENCIA
PRO TEMPORE DEL URUGUAY SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DEL2001 (Dec. 2001) [hereinafter INFORME
del Grupo Mercado Comtin] (on file with author).
22 Chopping Block: More troubles for Mercosur, ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 2000, at 40
[hereinafter Chopping Block]; Jonathan Karp & Pamela Druckerman, Big Latin Customs Union
Mercosur Reaches a Crossroads, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2000, at A 15 [hereinafter Crossroads].
U.S., Chile sign Free Trade Agreement in Miami, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jun. 6, 2003 [hereinafter
U.S., Chile], available at http://www.ajc.con/news/content/news/0603/07uschile.html.
' Summit of the Americas, Fourth Trade Ministerial, Joint Declaration, San Jose, Costa Rica
(Mar. 19, 1998) [hereinafter San Josd Declaration], available at http://www.alca-ftaa.org/
ministerials/costa-e.asp., Il 1-2.
24 Second Summit of the Americas, Plan of Action [hereinafter Second Plan of Action],
available at http.www.sice.oas.org/FrAA/santiago/sapoa-e 1.asp. II.A. 1.
' Free Trade Area of the Americas, Sixth Meeting of Ministers of Trade of the Hemisphere,
Ministerial Declaration, Buenos Aires, Argentina (Apr. 7, 2001), available at http://www.alca-
ftaa.org/ministerials/BAmin-e.asp, 3 [hereinafter Buenos Aires Declaration].
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"Common Market of the Twenty-First Century." In fact, it might not have a
future at all.26
The question remains whether either of the assessments of MERCOSUR
described above is accurate. In order to evaluate MERCOSUR, we must first
examine its goals and structure, evaluate the institutions through which it seeks
to implement its goals, and consider the effectiveness of the norms which the
organization has created in order to do so. Accordingly, Part II of this work
generally describes the Treaty of Asunci6n and describes and evaluates
MERCOSUR's institutions and its dispute resolution procedures. Part II
evaluates MERCOSUR's associate member relationships with Bolivia and
Chile, and its relationship with the EU. Part IV will then describe and use a
theoretical framework to evaluate the effectiveness and success of
MERCOSUR and provide a realistic assessment thereof.
II. MERCOSUR's ORIGINS AND INSTITUTIONS
A. The MERCOSUR Four: An Inevitable Marriage?
The idea that the nations of Latin America should undertake political and
economic integration is not recent. As early as 1797, immediately after the
independence of most Latin American nations from Spain, and throughout the
nineteenth century, a number of conferences and negotiations undertook
several attempts to create confederations or similar arrangements among the
various states of Central and South America.27
For a number of reasons, these efforts have tended to be unsuccessful in the
past.28 Many Latin American countries who have attempted economic or
political integration have had little in common with each other.29 Argentina,
26 A Decline without Parallel, ECONOMIST, Mar. 2, 2002, at 26. Although the economic
situation in both Argentina and Brazil has slightly improved since then, neither country has come
out of their economic doldrums. See infra notes 375-77 and accompanying text.
21 Id. One of the most interesting of these proposals is found in an 1826 document written
by Simon Bolivar. In it, he proposes that the nine newly independent nations of South America
enter into a political and economic union with the British empire. This proposal was not
seriously considered. JUAN LANUS, INTEGRACI6N ECON6MICA DE AMitRICA LATINA 21 (1973).
u LANUS, supra note 27, at 24-25; EDWARD S. MILENKY, THE PoLrrICS OF REGIONAL
INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA: THE LAFTA 11-12 (1973); JOHN MATHIS, ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA, THE PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS OFLAFTA 9-10 (1969); JUAN
PABLO VACCHINO, INTEGRACI6N LATINOAMERICANA: DE LA ALALC A LA ALADI 27 (1983).
29 MATHIS, supra note 28, at 17-18; VACCHINO, supra note 28, at 59, 72-79, 86; MILENKY,
supra note 28, at 70-74, 79.
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Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, on the other hand, seem unusually complementary
to each other, politically, economically and historically. They have many
things in common, starting with geography: three out of the four (Paraguay,
Argentina and Brazil) share extensive common borders,' as do Brazil and
Uruguay.3" Uruguay and Argentina were actually once politically united.32 The
political systems of all four countries had undergone recent substantial
democratization33and had taken part in the process of economic liberalization
that took place in the region in the 1970s and 1980s.34 All four countries
actually traded with each other, and had a history of economic cooperation,
including joint administration of transnational infrastructure projects.3"
In spite of prior cooperation between them in the construction of the Corpus
and Ytaipu dams in the late 1970s, relations in the early 1980s between Brazil
and Argentina were difficult. Argentine military governments tended to foster
rivalry with Brazil and their foreign policy towards that country tended to
stress competition rather than cooperation.36 Brazilian governments, on the
other hand, retorted with strong protectionist measures aimed at Argentine
exports, whose quantity and value had fallen greatly since 1980."7
This situation changed after the military regimes of Argentina and Brazil
were replaced by democratic governments in the mid-1980s. Both the
Brazilian and Argentine governments began to see the advantages of further
cooperation and integration and a series of agreements between them were
signed in quick succession.38
It can be argued that this turn of events was unavoidable. The relationship
between Argentina and Brazil has been described as similar to that of France
30 See UNITED STATES CENTRAL INTEIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACT BOOK 2002, available
at http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/wofact2002 [hereinafter CIA FACrBOOKJ.
31 id.
3 Argentina and Uruguay were part of the United Provinces of the River Plate from the time
of independence in 1815 through 1828. ERNESTO PALACID, HISTORIA DE LA ARGENTINA, 1515-
1983, 200-06, 255-59 (1986).
33 See PETER COFFEY, LATIN AMERICA-MERCOSUR 257-59 (1998).
34 Id. See also PAz MIL.ET ET AL, CHn-IE-MERCOSuR: UNA ALIAZA ESTRATEGICA 135
(1997) [hereinafter CHILE-MERCOSUR].
35 COFFEY, supra note 33, at 21-23, 29-33.
16 id. at 29-30.
3' ATILio ANIBAL ALTERINI & MAIA CRITINA BOLDORINI, EL SISTEMA JURIDICO EN EL
MERCOSUR; 1, ESTRUCrURAGENERAL-INSTRUMENTOS FUNDACIONALF Y COMPLEMENTARIOS
(1995) [hereinafter ALTERINI]. In this time period, however, trade between both countries was
significant. In 1983, for example, trade between Argentina and Brazil totaled $358 million in
exports from Argentina to Brazil and $654 million in imports. COFFEY, supra note 33, at 38.
38 COFFEY, supra note 33, at 4, 6. 30-34, 122-25.
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and Germany at the time of the creation of the European Economic Commu-
nity: both countries had a long history of (sometimes hostile) interrelation-
ships, and the exports of one (France, or in this case, Argentina) tended to be
primarily agricultural, while those of the other (Germany, or in this case,
Brazil) tended to be primarily industrial. 9
This complementarity becomes striking upon examination of certain
economic characteristics. To begin with, Brazil and Argentina are the largest
countries, in territory and population, in South America 4' and each has large
and highly developed consumer markets." Argentina is rich in natural
resources, and has a highly developed export-oriented agricultural sector,
which produces a variety of products. 2 Argentina's industrial sector also
produces a variety of products. 3 Argentina also has a very large service
sector, which accounted for sixty-six percent of GDP in 2001."' Its exports,
which were estimated at $26.5 billion in 2000, included edible oils, fuels and
energy, cereals, feed, and motor vehicles.' 5 Its imports, which totaled $23.8
billion in 2000, chiefly included machinery and equipment, motor vehicles,
chemicals, metal manufactures, and plastics. Argentina's principal trading
partners in 2000, for both exports and imports, included Brazil, the United
States, Chile, Spain, China, and Germany, with Brazil being both its principal
import and export partner.' 6 Argentina also exported 3.7 billion kWh and
imported 7.5 billion kWh of electricity in 2000.'
Brazil, on the other hand, has a much larger economy than Argentina
does,' 8 and has large and well-developed agricultural, mining, manufacturing,
39 Id. at 122; ALTERINI, supra note 37, at 168.
4 CIA FACrBOOK, supra note 30.
41 Id.
42 Id. These products include sunflower seeds, soybeans, lemons, grapes, corn, tobacco,
peanuts, tea, wheat and livestock. This sector was estimated to compose about six percent of
GDP in 2001. Id.
43 Id. These products include processed foods, motor vehicles, consumer durables, textiles,
chemicals and petrochemicals, and steel. This sector was estimated to compose about twenty-
eight percent of GDP in 2001. Id.
"Id.
4 Id. Argentina's principal export trading partners in 2000 were Brazil (26.5%), the United
States (11.8%), Chile (10.6%), and Spain (3.5%). Id.
46Id.
4 See id. (noting that imported electricity chiefly came from Paraguay).
4' Brazil had an estimated GDP (purchasing power parity) of $1.34 trillion in 2001. Id.
Argentina, on the other hand, had an estimated GDP (purchasing power parity) of $453 billion
in that year. Id.
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and service sectors."9 Its principal agricultural products include coffee,
soybeans, wheat, rice, corn, sugarcane, cocoa, citrus, and beef.50 Principal
industrial products include textiles, shoes, chemicals, cement, lumber, iron ore,
tin, steel, aircraft, motor vehicles, and other machinery and equipment. 1 Its
exports, which totaled $57.8 billion in 2001, are principally manufactured
goods, iron ore, soybeans, footwear, coffee, and autos.52 Its imports, which
totaled $57.7 billion in 2001, include machinery and equipment, chemical
products, oil, electricity, autos, and auto parts. Brazil's principal trading
partners in 2001, for both exports and imports, included the United States,
Argentina, Germany, Japan, Italy, and the Netherlands. 3 The United States
and Argentina were Brazil's principal trading partners.54 Brazil also imported
42.3 billion kWh of electricity from Paraguay in 2000."s
Uruguay, with a much smaller land mass56 and population57 than either
Brazil or Argentina, has as the largest sector of its economy a well-developed
services industry.58 Its agricultural sector, which principally produces rice,
wheat, corn, barley, livestock, and fish, is extensive and export-oriented. 9
Uruguay's industrial sector involves food processing, electrical machinery,
transportation equipment, petroleum products, textiles, chemicals, and
beverages.' Its exports, which totaled $2.24 billion in 2001, included meat,
49 In 2001, the agricultural sector composed 9% of GDP, the industrial sector 32% and the
services sector 59%. Id.
50 Id.
51 id.
52 Id. Brazil's principal export trading partners in 2001 included the United States (24.4%),
Argentina (11.2%), Germany (8.7%), Japan (5.5%) and Italy (3.9%). Id.
53 id.
14 Id. The United States accounted for approximately 24% of Brazil's exports and 23% of
its imports in 2001. Id. Argentina accounted for approximately 11% of Brazil's imports and
exports during 2001. Id.
55 Id.
56 Uruguay has a total area of approximately 176,000 square kilometers, compared with a
total area of approximately 8,500,000 square kilometers for Brazil and approximately 2,766,000
square kilometers for Argentina. Id.
17 Uruguay had an approximate total population of 3,386,000 in 2002, compared with an
approximate total population of 176,000,000 for Brazil and approximately 37,800,000 for
Argentina. Id.
" This sector represented 65% of Uruguay's GDP (purchasing power parity) of $31 billion
in 2001. Seventy percent of the Uruguayan labor force was employed in this sector. Id.
59 Id. This agricultural sector composed 29% of Uruguay's GDP for 2001 and employed
14% of its labor force. Id.
' Id. Uruguay also produced 7.5 billion kWh in 2000. Of this production, approximately
950 million kWh were exported, and the importation of approximately 1.3 billion kWh was
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rice, leather products, wool, vehicles, and dairy products. 6' Its imports, which
totaled $2.9 billion in 2001, chiefly included machinery, chemicals, road
vehicles, and crude petroleum. 62 Its principal trading partners in 2001, for both
exports and imports, were the MERCOSUR countries, the EU, and the United
States, with the MERCOSUR countries representing Uruguay's primary
trading partners.63
Paraguay, on the other hand, has a very different economy from the others.
Its informal sector, which includes both re-export of imported consumer goods
to neighboring countries and the activities of thousands of micro-enterprises
and urban street vendors, is extremely large and important. 64  A large
percentage of the population derives their living from agricultural activity,
often on a subsistence basis. 65 Paraguay grows cotton, sugarcane, soy beans,
corn, wheat, tobacco, tapioca, fruits, vegetables, beef, pork, eggs, milk, and
timber. 66 It has an industrial sector which produces cement, textiles,
beverages, and wood products.67  A principal export industry is that of
electricity generation, which accounted for substantial exports in 2000. 6' Its
principal exports, which totaled $2.2 billion in 2001, include electricity,
soybeans, feed, cotton, meat, and edible oils.69 Its principal imports included
road vehicles, consumer goods, tobacco, petroleum products, and electrical
machinery.7" Paraguay's principal trading partners included Argentina, Brazil,
and Uruguay.7'
Although there are a few areas of competition among them (such as the
automotive industry),72 a number of natural economic connections among them
necessary in order to meet local demand. Id.
61 id.
62 Id.
63 Id. The MERCOSUR countries accounted for approximately 40% of Uruguay's exports
and 44% of its imports. Id.
" Id. These activities take part informally, with their participants not reporting their
activities or their profits to any authorities. For this reason, accurate economic data on Paraguay
is very difficult to obtain. Id.




68 In that year, the Paraguayan electrical generation industry generated approximately 56




72 See Stephen P. Sorensen, Open Regionalism or Old Fashioned Protectionism? A Look at
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surface from the brief descriptions set forth above. Thus, Brazil's extensive
manufacturing sector has a natural market among Argentina's, Uruguay's, and
Paraguay's populations." Argentina's (and to a lesser degree Paraguay's)
extensive natural resources and agricultural sectors also have ready made
markets in Brazil. Uruguay has had extensive economic connections with
Argentina for many years. Its services industry (especially its financial
services sector) also has many potential customers across the Rio de la Plata
in Argentina. Lastly, Paraguay's electrical generation industry very profitably
supplements Argentina's and Brazil's massive energy needs.
These economic connections and long history of interaction among Brazil,
Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay make successful integration efforts among
them more likely to happen. Thus, MERCOSUR is a consummation of a
likely, if not inevitable, economic marriage.
B. Formalizing the Relationship
The first step on the path of greater cooperation between Brazil and
Argentina was taken in the Iguazu Declaration, signed by Presidents Alfonsin
of Argentina and Sarney of Brazil, on November 29, 1985.14 In this declara-
tion, both presidents indicated joint positions on a number of economic and
foreign policy issues." The most important parts of this Declaration, however,
were the agreement that cooperation, harmonization, and integration of a
number of sectors of the economy were desirable and the creation of an
implementation mechanism.76 The presidents then announced the creation of
a Joint Commission that would explore and make recommendations for
bilateral cooperation and integration.77
the Performance ofMERCOSUR's Auto Industry, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 371 (1998).
" Indeed, a point of contention between Brazil and Argentina during the recent economic
crisis was that Brazil was flooding Argentina's market with cheap imports. See infra notes 367-
81 and accompanying text.
7 lguazu Declaration, reprinted in TODO EL MERCOSUR: DESDE SUS PRIMEROS
ANTECEDENTES A LA UNION ADUANERA 51-57 (1995) [hereinafter IRI].
75 See id. § 9 (foreign debt), § 12 (support for the Contadora Group), § 13 (cooperation on
issues relating to the Plate River basin), § 14 (joint position on the Falklands Islands dispute),
and § 15 (drug policy).
76 Id. Some of these sections included: energy, transport, and communications (§§ 22-27),
scientific and technical cooperation (§§ 28-29), and general economic and commercial
cooperation (§ 30).
" Id. §§ 18-20.
[Vol. 32:1
MERCOSUR
Eight months later, the negotiations started by the Iguazu Declaration
resulted in an Agreement on Argentine-Brazilian Integration.78 The Integration
Agreement created an Integration and Economic Cooperation Program
between Brazil and Argentina. This program would involve a number of
economic sectors and would seek to achieve economic cooperation and
integration in a flexible and gradual fashion.79 Specific guidelines for
individual economic areas were set forth in twelve protocols. Between 1986
and 1988, Argentina and Brazil signed twelve more protocols covering other
economic sectors.8" This program was to be established and implemented by
an Implementation Commission which would meet every six months and
whose membership would consist of senior cabinet ministers from both
countries."
During this time period, Uruguay was also involved with economic
integration efforts with Brazil and Argentina. It" had signed economic
cooperation agreements with Argentina (known as CAUCE agreements, for
their Spanish acronym) in 1974 and 1985,82 and commercial expansion treaties
(known as PEC agreements for their Spanish acronym) in 1975 and 1986.83
These bilateral agreements gave Uruguay substantial tariff concessions for
exports to Argentina and Brazil, effectively granting it preferential access to
their markets. Not surprisingly, trade between Uruguay and Brazil and
Argentina increased substantially.84
Further negotiations between Argentina and Brazil resulted in the Act of
Buenos Aires, where both countries agreed in principle to establish a common
market between them. This common market would be implemented by
December 31, 1994.85
'8 Agreement on Argentine-Brazilian Integration, July 29, 1986, 27 I.L.M. 901 [hereinafter
Integration Agreement].
" Id. arts. 1-2.
80 See COFFEY, supra note 33, at 34. The first twelve protocols covered, capital goods,
wheat, complementarity of the food supply, expansion of trade, joint companies, financial
matters, investment funds, energy, biotechnology, economic studies, nuclear accidents and
radiological emergencies, and aeronautical cooperation. Integration Agreement, supra note 78,
at 902-04.
SI Integration Agreement, supra note 78, arts. 3-5.
82 ALTERiNi, supra note 37, at 166.
83 Id. at 168.
u COFFEY, supra note 33, at 166-70.
5 Act of Buenos Aires, reprinted in IRI, supra note 74, at 63-64.
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C. Creating a Common Market: Partial Scope Agreement 14
This agreement in principle was fleshed out in Partial Scope Agreement 14
(PSA 14) signed in Montevideo on December 20, 1990.86
PSA 14 set forth a number of concepts that would later be incorporated in
the Treaty of Asunci6n, which created MERCOSUR. First, the parties agreed
to eliminate all customs duties, tariffs and restrictions between them by
December 31, 1994.7 During the transition period before this date, all
previously agreed tariff preferences between both countries would be
maintained."8 This elimination of customs duties applied to all products, with
the exception of those excepted by the parties in Annexes III and IV to the
Agreement. Tariffs on these products were to be eliminated at the rate of
twenty percent a year.89 Second, the parties agreed, as a necessary adjunct to
the elimination of all tariffs, on the harmonization of all macroeconomic
policies, especially those linked to the flow of commerce." The parties also
agreed on rules of origin for products originating in their territory. These rules
of origin were also included in the treaty as an Annex.9'
During the transition period (until December 31, 1994), each country could
request the application of safeguard clauses against the importation of goods
from the other.92 When an importing nation felt that the increase in imports of
a particular good would cause great damage to its markets, it could solicit
consultations on how to minimize this damage. 93 These consultations could
result in agreement on the imposition of a "safeguard clause," which would
limit or otherwise place restrictions on imports of that good into the other
country for a period of up to one year.' The parties also agreed to promote
and adopt more measures to integrate their economies and correct any
temporary distortions in their markets caused by increased trade.95 The
86 Acuerdo de Complementaci6n Econ6mica, reprinted in IRI, supra note 74, at 65-73. This
agreement was filed with the Latin American Integration Association [hereinafter ALADI].
Treaty of Montevideo Establishing the Latin American Integration Association, Aug. 12, 1980,
20 I.L.M. 672 (1981), arts. 7-14 [hereinafter ALADI Treaty].
87 PSA 14, supra note 86, § 3.
IS Id. arts. 5, 6, 13-14.
89 Id. art. 8.
9° Id. art. 10.
9' Id. art. 15.
92 Id. art. 16.
9' Id. arts. 17-18.
94 Id. arts. 18-20.
9S Id. art. 22.
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agreement would be administered and implemented by the Argentina-Brazil
Common Market Group, which had been created by the Act of Buenos Aires.96
After the signature of the Act of Buenos Aires, Paraguay and Uruguay
expressed a strong interest injoining the Argentina-Brazil common market and
negotiations began on an agreement to create a common market among all four
countries.97 For Uruguay, this represented a natural "next step" from its prior
negotiations and agreements with Brazil and Argentina.98 For Paraguay, which
saw itself as a supplier of energy to its large neighbors, 99 this too represented
a natural progression from its prior cooperation on hydroelectric matters with
Argentina and Brazil.
Three months after the signature of PSA 14, on March 20, 1990, the
negotiations among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay resulted in the
signing of the Treaty of Asunci6n, which created MERCOSUR. As shall be
seen below, a whole new era of Latin American integration had begun.
D. The Treaty of Asunci6n, Its Protocols, and the Common Market
An analysis of MERCOSUR' s legal and institutional foundation must begin
with four key documents: the Treaty of Asunci6n and its five Annexes, Ouro
Preto, the Brasilia Protocol on the Resolution of Controversies, and the Olivos
Protocol for the Resolution of Controversies."° These documents form the
backbone of the MERCOSUR legal system. The Treaty of Asunci6n borrows
a large number of concepts from PSA 14 and looks very similar to that
agreement.'' Its purpose is to create a common market among its four
signatories (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) by December 31,
1994.102 This is the same date that PSA 14 sets for the elimination of all tariff
barriers among its signatories.'0 3 Like PSA 14, the Treaty of Asunci6n calls
for the graduated elimination of customs duties among its signatories at the
rate of twenty percent a year (with certain exceptions for Paraguay and
I ld. arts. 23-24; Act of Buenos Aires, supra note 85, art. 2.
97 ALTERINI, supra note 37, at 73-75.
98 Id.
99 COFFEY, supra note 33, at 9.
"0 Protocol of Brasilia for the Solution of Controversies, MERCOSUR/CMC/Dec
No. 1/91(I), available at http://www.mercosur.org.uy [hereinafter Brasilia]; Protocolo de Olivos
Para La Solucion de Controversias en el MERCOSUR. MERCOSUR/GANPSSC/Acta No. 5/01
(Feb. 18, 2002), available at http://www.mercosur.org.uy [hereinafter Olivos].
'0' See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
'0 Asunci6n, supra note 1, art. 1.
1o3 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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Uruguay)," 4 the exception of certain mutually agreed-upon areas from these
tariff reductions, 0 5 the harmonization of economic policies,'06 the creation of
rules of origin very similar to those of PSA 14,107 and the continuation of the
safeguard clause system.'08 Unlike PSA 14, the Treaty of Asunci6n calls for
a common external tariff and for the adoption of a common trade policy.'
Ouro Preto creates a number of additional MERCOSUR institutions and
further enumerates and expands the roles of all of these institutions. Brasilia
and Olivos augment the perfunctory provisions set forth in the Treaty of
Asunci6n and Ouro Preto"0 for the resolution of disputes among member
states and individuals. The major provisions of the latter documents will be
discussed in some detail below.
E. The MERCOSUR Institutions
Under the Treaty, Ouro Preto, and Olivos, seven institutions are charged
with implementing MERCOSUR's principles and purposes. They include the
Council of the Common Market (Council), the Common Market Group
(Group), the MERCOSUR Commerce Commission (MCC), the Joint
Parliamentary Commission, the Economic and Social Consultative Forum
(Forum), the Administrative Secretariat (Secretariat), and the Permanent
Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal).
The Council consists of the Foreign Relations and Economics Ministers of
the four member states."' Its presidency rotates among the member states, in
alphabetical order, every six months." 2 The Council is responsible for the
political leadership of the integration process and for making decisions to
ensure the implementation of the objectives of the Treaty of Asunci6n." 3 In
addition, the Council is the legal representative of MERCOSUR, entitled to
sign agreements with third-party countries, groups of countries, or interna-
tional organizations.' It supervises the other MERCOSUR institutions, and
'0' Asunci6n, supra note I, art. 5(a); Annex 1, art. 7.
'05 Id. at Annex I, art. 7(b).
'06 Id. arts. 2, 5(b).
107 Id. at Annex II.
'0' Id. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
'09 Asunci6n, supra note 1, arts. 1, 5(c).
"0 Id. at Annex III; Ouro Preto, supra note 5, arts. 43-44.
'" Asunci6n, supra note 1, art. 11; Ouro Preto, supra note 5, art. 4.
112 Asunci6n, supra note 1, art. 12; Ouro Preto, supra note 5, art. 5.
113 Ouro Preto, supra note 5, art. 3.
14 Id. art. 8(III-V).
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can modify or eliminate them." 5 It also acts on policy proposals sent to it by
the Group" 6 and has the power to designate the Director of the Secretariat." 7
The Council acts by means of "Decisions," which, according to Ouro Preto, are
"obligatory for the member states.""' The Council is the most important and
powerful MERCOSUR institution.
The Group has four alternate representatives from each member state
designated by their governments." 9 Representatives from the economics and
foreign ministries and central bank must be included in each member state's
delegation. Each member state's delegates are coordinated by its minister of
foreign relations. 2 The Group's principal responsibilities include monitoring
compliance with the Treaty of Asunci6n, proposing policy for consideration
by the Council and ensuring compliance with Council decisions.' Analysis
and recommendations on proposals or recommendations submitted by other
MERCOSUR institutions are also part of the Group's responsibilities.122 It
may, if authorized by the Council, become MERCOSUR's representative in
negotiating agreements with non-member countries, groups of countries, or
international organizations.'23 Administratively, the Group approves the
MERCOSUR budget, the Secretariat's annual expenditures, and supervises the
Secretariat staff and Council meetings.' 24 The Group has its own internal
"I Id. art. 8(VII).
116 Id. art. 8(V).
Iu d. art. 8(IX).
"' Id. art. 9.
I1 ld. art. 11.
120 Id.
122 Id. art. 14(I-11).
123 Id. art. 14(VI).
121 Id. art. 14(VII).
124 Id. art. 14 (VIII-XIV).
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regulations' 25 and can create "working subgroups" to assist it in its work.'26
The Group's "Resolutions" are "binding on the member states."' 27
The Council and the Group bear a superficial resemblance to the EU's
Council and Commission. In both organizations, the Council is controlled by
the member states and has the power to create policy or "community law,"' 28
while the other institutions, the Commission in the EU and the Group in
MERCOSUR, represent the proposer and implementer of policy.'29 The
European Commission and the Group are, however, very different institutions.
The former is a supranational institution whose members are independent of
the member states and which controls a substantial permanent staff. It has a
substantial independent power base.'30 The latter is controlled by the member
states, whose senior civil servants serve as its members. It has no staff and no
independent power base. Its role seems to be primarily administrative, rather
than that of a planning and policy-making entity. 31
The MCC, a creature of Ouro Preto, has four representatives and four
alternates from each member state. 131 It implements the common commercial
policy agreed to by the member states and monitors its application. Decisions
regarding the administration and application of the common external tariff, as
well as proposals relating to changes to the common external tariff and the
common commercial policy, are also part of its responsibilities. The MCC
also provides information to the Group on the evolution and application of the
2 Reglamento Interno del Grupo Mercado Comiin, MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC No. 04/1991,
available at http://www.mercosur.org.uy/paginalesp.htm.
126 The Group currently has twelve working groups (Communications, Mines, Technical
Regulations and Evaluation, Financial Affairs, Transport and Infrastructure, Environment,
Industry, Agriculture, Energy, Labor, Employment and Social Security, and Health and
Investments), seven ad hoc groups (Institutional Aspects, Sugar, External Relations,
Administrative Secretariat Budget, Treatment of Public Policies that Distort Competition, Public
Contracts, and Followup of Economic and Commercial Linkages) five Specialized Meetings
(Science and Technology, Tourism, Social Communication, Women, and Drugs and Drug
Addicts), a Service Group, and three Commissions (Sociolaboral, Administrative/Mercosur-
Bolivia, and Administrative/Mercosur-Chile), available at http://www.mercosur.org.uy/espanol/
sinf/varios/gmc.htm.
17 Ouro Preto, supra note 5, art. 15.
..8 Malcom Rowat et al., Competition Policy and MERCOSUR, WORLD BANK TECHNICAL
PAPER No. 385 at 14, 15 (Oct. 1997) [hereinafter RL+P]. See, e.g., TREATY ESTABUSHING THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNrrY, art. 189, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, as amended by
subsequent treaties, available at http://europa.eu.int. [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
29 See, e.g., Treaty of Rome, supra note 128, art. 211.
3o See e.g., id. arts. 156-159.
.3 See Ouro Preto, supra note 5.
1' Id. art. 17.
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common commercial policy.'33 It considers and decides applications submitted
to it by the member states regarding the administration of MERCOSUR's
common external tariff and common commercial policies. It monitors matters
dealing with common commercial policies, intra-MERCOSUR trade, and trade
relations between MERCOSUR and non-member states.' 34 It has internal
regulations which regulate its proceedings.' 35 Furthermore, it also has the
power to create Sub-Working Groups to examine and make proposals
regarding different specific areas related to the common external tariff and the
common commercial policy.'36 It also has, under Olivos, the power to consider
claims by individuals relating to member state violations of the Treaty and
community law.' 37 The MCC issues either "Directives" or "Proposals," with
the former being "binding on the member states."' 38 The MCC, with its
specialized personnel, is a technical body whose principal task involves the
analysis of areas of policy and the preparation of proposals relating thereto.
The Joint Parliamentary Commission, another Ouro Preto creation, serves
as a representative of the legislatures of the member states.'3 9 Each member
state has an equal number of delegates who are designated by their parlia-
ments." Its principal missions include planning and setting the stage for the
creation of a future MERCOSUR parliament."' It is also meant to be an
institution to assist MERCOSUR in the implementation of its policies and in
the harmonization of national legislation therewith. 142 It has an advisory
function at this point.
3 Id. art. 19.
134 Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 1, art. 16; Ouro Preto, supra note 5, art. 19.
t Reglamento Interno de la Comisi6n de Comericio del Mercosur, MERCOSUR/GMC/Res
61/96 (1996), available at http://www.mercosur.og.uy/espanollsnor/normativa/resolucionesl
1996/RES9661.htm [hereinafter Internal Regulations].
136 Ouro Preto, supra note 5, art 19(IX); Internal Regulations, supra note 135, art. 6(IX). The
MCC currently has several Technical Committees: Tariffs, Nomenclature, and Classification of
Goods; Customs Matters; Commercial Disciplines and Norms; Competition; Consumer
Protection; and Public Policies Distorting Competitiveness. It also has a Commercial Defense
and Safeguard Measures Committee, available at http://www.mercosur.org.uy/espanol/snor/
estructura/CCM.HTM.
'3 Olivos, supra note 100, arts. 39-43.
'~s Ouro Preto, supra note 5, art. 20.
'3 Id. art. 22.
"0 Id. arts. 23-24.
341 Reglamento de [a Comisi6n Parlamentaria Conjunta del MERCOSUR,
MERCOSUR/CPCIRes. No. 2/97 (1997), art. 3, available at http://www.mercosur.org.uyl
espanol/sinf/varios/CPCREG.HTM.
142 Ouro Preto, supra note 5, art. 25.
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Under Ouro Preto, the Forum's members represent the various sectors of
economic and social life, such as merchants, consumers and workers. 43 Its
functions are purely advisory and this advice takes the form of "Recommenda-
tions" to the Group and other MERCOSUR institutions.'" It is meant to
"cooperate actively" to promote economic and social progress within
MERCOSUR, analyze and evaluate the social and economic impact of the
various integration policies and their implementation, recommend economic
and social norms and policies relating to integration, and perform studies and
research on economic and social matters relevant to MERCOSUR.
4 5
The Secretariat is the only institution within MERCOSUR to have a
permanent staff. It is permanently headquartered in Montevideo, Uruguay,'46
and, at present, its staff consists of approximately twenty-seven persons.' 47 Its
proposed 2002 budget was approximately $980,000.148 The Secretariat's
responsibilities include translation of documents, logistical support for all of
the other institutions, editing the MERCOSUR Official Gazette, gathering
information for the other institutions, and handling communications with the
member states. 49 The Secretariat also has the task of monitoring and reporting
on the implementation of all the MERCOSUR norms by each of the member
states into its national legal system. 5 0 Furthermore, the Secretariat manages
the panel of arbitrators established by Brasilia and Olivos to resolve disputes
arising out of the Treaty of Asunci6n and its implementation.'' The
Secretariat appears to have no substantive decision-making power. Again, the
member states of MERCOSUR have clearly sought to ensure that control over
the integration process remains in the hands of the member states and not in
a group of independent international civil servants. The Secretariat is headed
41 Id. art. 28.
'4 Id. art. 29.
41 Reglamento Interno del Foro Consultivo Econ6mico-Social, MERCOSUR/GMC/Res. No.
68/96 art. 2 (I-VI) (1996), available at http://www.mercosur.org.uy/espanollsnor/normativa/
resoluciones/1996/RES9668.htm.
' Ouro Preto, supra note 5, art. 31.
"7 Estructura y Manual de Cargos y Funciones de la Secretarfa Administrativa del
MERCOSUR, MERCOSUR/GMC/RES No. 15/02 (2002), available at http://www.mercosur.
org.uy/espanol/snor/normativa/resoluciones/2002/0215.htm [hereinafter Res 15/02].
4' Presupuestode la SAM para el ejercicio 2002, MERCOSUR/GMC/Res No. 01/02 (2002),
available at http://www.mercosur.org.uy/espanollsnor/normative/resolucionesl2002/020 1.htm
[hereinafter Res. 01/02].
149 Ouro Preto, supra note 5, art. 32.
150 Id. art. 32(IV).
"5 Id. art. 32(V). See infra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
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by a director which is appointed by the Group.'52 The MERCOSUR Secretar-
iat is divided into four major sections: Documents and Communications,
Norms, Administration, and Information Technology.'53
MERCOSUR's quasi-judicial institution, the Appellate Tribunal, is
discussed in the next section.
F. Dispute Resolution Procedures and Institutions
MERCOSJR' s dispute resolution procedures and institutions are set forth
in Brasilia and Olivos.
54
1. Member State Disputes
Brasilia and Olivos provide that controversies between member states
regarding the interpretation of, application of, or failure to comply with
Asunci6n or any of its Protocols, Council Decisions and Group Resolutions
("controversy"),1 55 are subject to the dispute resolution procedures set forth
therein. Olivos allows a controversy to be submitted, either by the complain-
ant or by mutual agreement of the parties, to the dispute resolution systems of
the World Trade Organization (WTO), or to any other international economic
organization (IEO) in which the individual may participate.'56 The parties to
a controversy should first engage in direct negotiations to resolve the
controversy and inform the Secretariat of their progress and the results
thereof. 57 If the controversy is not resolved, or only partially resolved by
these negotiations, any member state involved therein may submit it to the
Group for resolution.' Each party to the controversy will then present its
position to the Group, which will consult experts and analyze and evaluate
2 Ouro Preto, supra note 5, art. 33.
153 Res No. 15/02, supra note 147, art. 3 (01).
154 Brasilia, supra note 100. Olivos will enter into effect thirty days after the deposit of the
fourth ratification thereto. Olivos, supra note 100, art. 52. At thatpoint, its provisions expressly
repeal Brasilia and its regulations. Olivos, id. art. 55. To date, no ratifications have been
deposited. As shall be seen below, Olivos continues a substantial number of the provisions of
Brasilia.
153 Brasilia, supra note 100, art. 1; Olivos, supra note 100, art. 1.
156 Olivos, supra note 100, art 1(2).
'2 Brasilia, supra note 100, arts. 2-3; Olivos, supra note 100, arts. 4-5. Under Olivos, these
negotiations must be concluded within fifteen days. Olivos, supra note 100, arts. 4-5.
"' Brasilia, supra note 100, art. 4(I). Olivos, supra note 100, art. 6.
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each party's claim. 1 59 The Group will then present a recommended resolution
of the controversy to the parties.16
If the Group's recommendation is rejected by one of the parties, or, under
Olivos, if the complainant chooses to at the conclusion of negotiations, then
any party to the controversy is free to seek arbitration before an ad hoc panel
of three arbitrators (from a list kept by the Secretariat).' 6' Under Olivos, the
parties to a controversy which has not been resolved by negotiations may agree
to submit the controversy to the Tribunal rather than to the Group or an ad hoc
arbitration panel, for resolution. In such a situation, the Tribunal acts as an
arbitration panel and its decision is final.' 62 Both the tribunal and arbitral
panel are free to apply "community law" and "applicable principles of
international law" to resolve the controversy and must render its decision
within a maximum period of ninety days. 63 Member states refusing to comply
with such an arbitral award may be subject to member states imposition of
"temporary compensatory measures."
'164
2. Appealing the Award
Olivos dramatically changes MERCOSUR's dispute resolution mechanism
by making arbitration awards appealable to the Tribunal created therein. 65
The Tribunal is to be composed of five arbitrators, four of whom are appointed
by each member state for two-year terms (renewable twice)," and one of
whom shall be unanimously appointed by all the member states for a three-year
nonrenewable term. 67 The appeal will be limited to legal issues dealt with in
s Brasilia, supra note 100, art. 4(2). Olivos, supra note 100, art. 6.
'6 Brasilia, supra note 100, art. 5. Olivos, supra note 100, art. 6. Under Olivos, the Group
must do so within thirty days. Olivos, supra note 100, art. 8.
16 Brasilia, supra note 100, art. 9; Olivos, supra note 100, art. 10.
162 Olivos, supra note 100, art. 23.
' Brasilia, supra note 100, arts. 19-20. Olivos, supra note 100, arts. 16, 34.
1 Brasilia, supra note 100, art. 23. Olivos, supra note 100, at 31-2. The Olivos Protocol
expands the concept of "compensatory measures" a lot. They are described as measures such
as "the suspension of concession or equivalent obligations." Olivos, supra note 100, art. 31 (1).
These compensatory measures should involve, to the highest degree possible, the suspension of
concessions or obligations in the same economic sector or sectors as the controversy. Id. art.
31(2). Disputes regarding the question of whether compensatory measures in particular are
necessary or appropriate may be submitted to an arbitration panel or the Tribunal. Id. art. 32.
" Olivos, supra note 100, art. 17(1).
t66 Id. art. 18()-(2).




the award or to legal interpretations of community law set forth in the award,' 68
and will be considered, depending on the number of member states involved
in the controversy, by three or five arbitrators.'69 The Tribunal must render an
award within thirty days after the filing of a response to the appeal 7 ' and in its
own award may confirm, modify, or revoke the legal reasoning and the
decision of the award of the original arbitration panel.' 7 ' It shall prevail over
the arbitration panel's award. '72
Awards of the Tribunal and arbitration panels are to be adopted by majority
vote and signed by all of its members. 7a Awards of the Tribunal are firm,
final, unappealable, and obligatory to all member states involved in the
controversy.' 74 Awards of arbitration panels are firm, final, and obligatory to
the parties involved therein, unless they have been appealed to the Tribunal. 
Awards must be complied with in accordance with their terms within the time
period set forth therein.'76
Any of the parties to a controversy may request clarification of the award
from the Tribunal or arbitration panel.'77 A beneficiary of an award who feels
that the measures taken thereunder do not comply with its provisions may
bring this matter to the Tribunal or arbitration panel, which will determine
within thirty days whether the award has been complied with. 78
3. Claims by Individuals
Individuals with a claim against a member state based on the sanction or
application by that state, in violation of the Treaty, its Protocols, Council
Decisions or Group Resolution, of legal or administrative measures which have
a restrictive, discriminatory, or disloyally competitive effect on that individual
'6 Id. art. 17(2).
" Id. art. 20. When the controversy involves two member states, the Tribunal will consist
of three arbitrators, one from each member state and one chosen by the Administrative
Secretariat. Id. art. 20(1). When the dispute involves more than two member states, the Tribunal
will consist of five arbitrators. Id. art. 20(2).
170 Id. art. 2 1.
17' Id. art. 22(1).
172 Id. art. 22(2).
"I Id. art. 25.
174 Id. art. 26(2).
175 Id. art. 26(1).
176 Id. art. 29(1).
"77 Id. art. 28.
178 Id. art. 30.
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("individual controversy") 7 9 may file a claim before the National Section of
the Group where the claimant resides. 80 The National Section of the Group
which receives the claim will either (a) negotiate with the National Section of
the Group to which the member state against whom the claim has been brought
to resolve it belongs, or (b) send the claim to the Group without any further
proceeding or recommendation.'' The Group will then evaluate the claim and
may dismiss it or convene a panel of experts on the subject matter of the
controversy for an opinion on its merits. 2 The panel of experts consists of at
least three members appointed by the Group8 3 and will render a decision
regarding the individual controversy to the Group.'" If the claimant agrees
with the decision, then any member state may request from the defendant
member state the annulment of the challenged actions or corrective measures.
If the defendant member state refuses to provide such relief, then the member
state requesting relief may commence an arbitration proceeding against the
defendant member state under the process described above. 5
This MERCOSUR dispute resolution system, even as strengthened by the
addition of the Tribunal in Olivos, is simply not adequate and leaves much to
be desired. The system is chiefly designed to be used where two or more
member states submit a dispute arising out of the MIERCOSUR norms to an ad
hoc panel of arbitrators appointed for that particular case. There is no
effective mechanism to protect the rights under community law of individual
entities or persons. Furthermore, there is no effective mechanism by means of
which the institution itself can enforce compliance with its norms. It is
cumbersome and complicated to use, and its three-part process is guaranteed
to ensure a lengthy wait prior to any resolution of the dispute. Justice delayed
is often justice denied, especially if one of the parties to the dispute feels that
this lack of resolution is harmful to its interests. 8 6 Furthermore, this system
is inadequate to deal with what is likely to be a major component of the
majority of disputes: the interpretation of the meaning or intent of a particular
MERCOSUR norm. There is no court that can issue interpretations of these
norms in a consistent fashion to create a body of knowledge that parties in the
future can rely upon in planning their actions. These arbitrators, depending on
17 Brasilia, supra note 100, art. 25; Olivos, supra note 100, art. 39.
ISO Brasilia, supra note 100, art. 26; Olivos, supra note 100, art. 40.
181 Brasilia, supra note 100, arts. 27-28; Olivos, supra note 100, art. 41.
182 Brasilia, supra note 100, art. 29; Olivos, supra note 100, art. 42.
183 Brasilia, supra note 100, art. 30; Olivos, supra note 100, art. 43.
14 Brasilia, supra note 100, art. 32; Olivos, supra note 100, art. 44.
185 Brasilia, supra note 100, art. 32; Olivios, supra note 100, art. 44.
186 See, e.g., Brasilia, supra note 100, art. 19(1); Olivos, supra note 100, art. 34.
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their identity or nationality, may not necessarily be objective. The arbitrators
are selected from a list of arbitrators compiled and kept by MERCOSUR.
They serve for the individual case, and there is no guarantee that they will be
reappointed to another case. '87 They are not obligated to follow (or even take
into account) any other arbitrator's reasoning or interpretations. They create
their own rules of procedure and have great discretion about what law they will
apply and how they will do so. 88 Although the arbitration awards entered into
pursuant to this system are published, the process itself is private among the
parties only. Participation by others, such as amici curiae, is not contem-
plated.
The addition of a "permanent" appellate arbitration panel to hear appeals
under Olivos does not really solve this problem. The Tribunal is simply a
"super arbitration panel" which operates as such, and which is empowered to
resolve issues of law and policy interpretation dealt with by another, more ad
hoc panel. Again, there is no procedure for intervention by other interested
parties. It is true that its members, by virtue of their appointment for a period
of years, will have the opportunity to develop a consistent set of interpretations
of community law. This is not, however, the equivalent of a panel of
permanently appointed, objective, professional judges, sitting in open court in
transparent proceedings and issuing opinions that will be perceived as fair by
virtue of this transparency and the opportunity to participate therein of all
persons or entities who might have an interest in the controversy, whether they
are a direct litigant or not. This perception of fairness ensures that its rulings
will be followed (or at least acquiesced to) by all participants.'89 The process
is not transparent even though the rulings are kept by the Secretariat in a
publicly available compilation."g
" There are only three arbitrators from the list who have served more than once. See Lista
de Arbitros, available at http://www.mercosur.org.uy/espanol/snor/varioslista-de-arbitros.htm
(last visited Dec. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Arbitros].
"I Even though Brasilia authorizes an arbitral tribunal to adopt provisional remedies to
prevent "irreparable harm to one of the parties," the important question to ask is: who will
enforce these provisional remedies? There is no real enforcement provision in Brasilia for these
remedies. Who is to prevent the malefactor from simply ignoring the arbitral tribunal's order?
See Brasilia, supra note 100, art. 18; Olivos, supra note 100, art. 15.
89 Indeed, there are some European Court of Justice (ECJ) cases where the court has actually
"created" new legal principles out of provisions of the Treaty of Rome. See, e.g., Case 26/62,
van Gend en Loos v. Nederlande Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 3. The Court's
high standing among the member states makes it certain that decisions such as this will be
accepted.
190 Ouro Preto, supra note 5, art. 32.
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To date, the process has been used a limited number of times. 9' These
awards are not likely to form an intelligible body of jurisprudence providing
parties with reliable and consistent interpretations of community norms.
Finally, and most important, the enforcement mechanism for these arbitral
awards is extremely weak.192 Given the fact that all decisions by MERCOSUR
institutions are required to be taken by consensus and in the presence of all the
member states, 193 it is unlikely that a unanimous decision to sanction a member
state will ever be made. Furthermore, a boycott of the proceedings by a
member state would prevent the Council from making such a decision in the
first place. This system is clearly not designed to be a mechanism which
MERCOSUR itself can use to enforce compliance with the norms it enacts.
Clearly, a better system is needed.
III. To INFINITY AND BEYOND: CHILE, BOLIVIA, AND THE EU
A. Chile and Bolivia Join MERCOSUR
In 1996, after extensive (and often difficult) negotiations, 94MERCOSUR
entered into Economic Complementation Agreements, first with Chile 195 and
"' There have been nine Laudos Arbitrales (arbitration awards): (I) Comunicados DECEX
(Arg./Bras.); (II) Came de cerdo (Arg./Bras.); (III) Productos textiles (Bras./Arg.); (IV) Pollos
(Bras./Arg.); (V) Bicicletas (Uru./Arg.); (VI) Neumaticos (Uru./Bras.); (VII) Fitoanitarios
(Arg./Bras.) (VIII) IMESI (Para.fUru.) (IX) Lana (Arg/Uru.), available athttp://www.mercosur.
org.uy/espanol/snor/normativa/laudos.htm [hereinafter Laudos].
192 Article 23 of Brasilia and Articles 31 and 32 of Olivos provide for "temporary
compensatory measures" (such as the suspension of concessions "or other equivalents") awarded
by the other member states as the sole enforcement remedy for a successful party in a dispute.
Brasilia, supra note 100, art. 23. Olivos, supra note 100, arts. 31, 32.
'" Ouro Preto, supra note 5, art. 37.
'99 Negotiations with Chile took two years and were described in the press as "tough". See,
e.g., Radl Ronzoni, Trade: Accord with Chile Expands Horizons of MERCOSUR, Mar. 26,1996,
at LEXIS/Nexis, ALLNEWSPLUS Database. Negotiations with Bolivia were similarly
described. See, e.g., Juan Carlos Rocha, Integration: Mixed Feelings Mark Bolivian Entry into
MERCOSUR, Dec. 16, 1996, at LEXIS, ALLNEWSPLUS Database; Mario Osava, Integration:
MERCOSUR Takes on New Dimensions, Dec. 17, 1996, at LEXIS, ALLNEWSPLUS database;
Geoff Dyer, Bolivia Link to MERCOSUR hit by last-minute Hitch, Dec. 17, 1996, at LEXIS,
ALLNEWSPLUS Database; Fabiana Frayssinet & Mario Osava, Integration: MERCOSUR takes
Two Steps Forward, One Step Back, Dec. 18, 1996, available at LEXIS, ALLNEWSPLUS
Database. For a detailed analysis of the negotiations between Chile and MERCOSUR, see
Manuel Valencia, Negociaci6n de Chile con el MERCOSUR: Realidades y Oportunidades, in
CHILE-MERCOSUR, supra note 34.
'" The agreement with Chile was executed on June 25, 1996, at San Luis, Argentina. Chile
Agreement, supra note 13.
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then with Bolivia. '96 Both agreements are highly similar in format and content,
and establish a similar relationship.
MERCOSUR chose to incorporate Chile and Bolivia, not by making them
full members and parties to its existing agreements, but by creating a separate
relationship with them altogether. This relationship established by the Chile
and Bolivia agreements has been described as one of "associate membership"
in MERCOSUR. '97 This description is somewhat inaccurate. The agreements,
entered into with MERCOSUR as Economic Complementation Agreements
under the framework of ALADI,' 98 are not intended to give either Chile or
Bolivia any kind of membership status therein. Instead, the agreements
establish relationships which have as primary goals the establishment of a free-
trade area with Chile and Bolivia within a period of ten years, the creation of
judicial institutional frameworks foreconomic integration and cooperation, the
promotion of economic, scientific, technological and energy cooperation and
complementation, the promotion of reciprocal investment, and the promotion
of the development of physical infrastructure facilities.' These relationships
are very carefully enumerated and described in the agreements, and are
administered and implemented by a separate Administrative Committee for
each, and not by any of the MERCOSUR institutions.00 Chile and Bolivia do
not have, under the agreements, the right to attend or participate in the
meetings or in the work of any of the MERCOSUR institutions. They also are
not bound by MERCOSUR's common external tariff.20'
196 The agreement with Bolivia was executed on Dec. 17, 1996, at Fortaleza, Brazil. Bolivia
Agreement, supra note 13.
197 See, e.g., Thomas O'Keefe, The Chile-MERCOSUR Free Trade Agreement Effects on
Foreign Direct Investment in the Southern Cone, AM. L. Bus. REP., Aug. 31, 1996, at 4; Dyer,
supra note 194.
'98 See ALADI Treaty, supra note 86, at ch. 1, art. 2; ch. 2, art. 8; ch. 2, art. 11 and
accompanying text.
199 See Chile Agreement, supra note 13, art. 1; Bolivia Agreement, supra note 13, art. 1.
See Chile Agreement, supra note 13, art. 46; Bolivia Agreement, supra note 13, art. 39.
It should be noted, however, that the MERCOSUR component of the Administrative
Commission is the Group.
20 A number of Council Decisions have, however, given Chile and Bolivia the right to
participate in the meetings and work of the MERCOSUR institutions, to the degree that Chile
and Bolivia are entitled to participate in many, if not most or all, such meetings or work. See,
e.g., Particpaci6n de Chile en Reuniones del MERCOSUR, MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC No. 12/97,
available athttp://www.mercosur.org.uy/espanollsnor/normafivadecisiones/1997/9712.htm (last
visited Dec. 1,2003); Aceuerdo sobre Extrdici6n entre el MERCOSUR, la Reptiblicade Bolivia
y la Republica de Chile, MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC No. 15/98, available at http://www.mercosur.
org.uy/espanollsnor/normativa/decisiones/1998/9815.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2003).
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1. The Agreements
a. Trade Liberalization Program
The Chile and Bolivia agreements are extremely similar. After describing
very similar objectives, 202 they then assert that a free trade area will be
established, by means of a trade liberation program, between MERCOSUR and
the other contracting party within ten years. This trade liberation program will
consist of a program of gradual and automatic tariff reductions over all
tariffs2 3 on products originating in and proceeding from the territory of the
contracting parties.2 This program of tariff reductions is different for each
agreement. The Chile Agreement, for example, sets a general timetable of ten
years, starting with the automatic reduction of all tariffs on products not
otherwise noted in the agreement.2 5 Twelve annexes list categories of
products to whom different rules will apply. Some of these products will have
their tariffs reduced within ten years, but at a different rate, 2° some within
eight years,2 7 and others within fifteen to sixteen years. 28  Similarly, the
Bolivia Agreement contains a general tariff reduction timetable of ten years 29
and special rules with timetables ranging from immediate elimination to fifteen
years for seven different categories of products.2 0 In both agreements, the
parties also agree to not impose new tariffs, increase existing ones in a
discriminatory manner, or maintain or apply new non-tariff restrictions on
imports. 21 Three other characteristics of the Agreements' trade liberalization
202 Compare Chile Agreement, supra note 13, art. 1, with Bolivia Agreement, supra note 13,
art. 1.
203 The term "tariff' is broadly defined. It includes customs tariffs and any other charge with
equivalent effect, whether of a fiscal, monetary, exchange rate or other nature, that is set on
imports. Chile Agreement, supra note 13, art. 5; Bolivia Agreement, supra note 13, art. 5.
204 Chile Agreement, supra note 13, art. 2; Bolivia Agreement, supra note 13, art. 2.
205 Chile Agreement, supra note 13, art. 2(a).
206 Id. arts. 2(c)-(e).
207 Id. art. 2(b).
208 Id. arts. 2(f)-(i).
209 Bolivia Agreement, supra note 13, art. 2(a).
20 Id. arts. 2(b)-(h).
21" Id. arts. 6-8; Chile Agreement, supra note 13, arts. 6-8. Certain exceptions to these rules,
specifically noted in each agreement's Complementary Notes, are permitted. Bolivia Agreement,
supra note 13, arts. 6-8; Chile Agreement, supra note 13, arts. 6-8.
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programs include the adoption of rules of origin,"' national treatment on
internal taxation,2" 3 and the adoption of safeguard measures." 4
b. Economic Harmonization, Integration, and Cooperation
The Agreements describe in detail a number of initiatives that are meant to
promote economic harmonization, integration, and cooperation between
MERCOSUR and Chile and Bolivia. First, the signatories agree to base their
policies in a number of areas on the agreements and standards set forth by the
WTO.2" 5 The parties to both agreements also agree to promote scientific,
industrial, commercial and technical cooperation;2 16 the freeing, expanding,
and progressive diversification of services within their territories; 217 physical
integration, defined as the harmonization of land, sea and air routes;2'8 and the
promotion of reciprocal investments. 29 The Bolivia Agreement also provides
212 Chile Agreement, supra note 13, art. 13, Annex 13; Bolivia Agreement, supra note 13,
art. 12 and Annex 9.
2 Chile Agreement, supra note 13, art. 14, Bolivia Agreement, supra note 13, art. 13.
214 The concept of safeguard clauses was created and applied in the Treaty of Asunci6n. See
Asunci6n, supra note 1, art. 3, Annex 9 and accompanying text. Here both Agreements differ.
The Chile Agreement provides that the parties will put a system of safeguard measures (not
described) in effect by January 1, 1997. Chile Agreement, supra note 13, art. 21. The Bolivia
Agreement contains a system of safeguard clauses. Bolivia Agreement, supra note 13, art. 20,
Annex 10.
2I These areas include dumping, countervailing duties, and competition (Chile Agreement,
supra note 13, arts. 15-20; Bolivia Agreement, supra note 13, arts. 14-17); export incentives
(Chile Agreement, supra note 13, arts. 30-31; Bolivia Agreement, supra note 13, arts. 18-19);
customs valuation norms (Chile Agreement, supra note 13, arts. 23-24; Bolivia Agreement,
supra note 13, art. 22); sanitary and phytosanitary measures and technical norms and regulations
(Chile Agreement, supra note 13, arts. 25-29; Bolivia Agreement, supra note 13, arts. 23-25).
The Chile Agreement also includes intellectual property. Chile Agreement, supra note 13, art.
43.
216 Chile Agreement, supra note 13, arts. 44-45; Bolivia Agreement, supra note 13, art. 38.
217 Chile Agreement, supra note 13, arts. 34-35; Bolivia Agreement, supra note 13, art. 33.
218 Chile Agreement, supra note 13, arts. 33, 37-40; Bolivia Agreement, supra note 13, art.
34.
29 Chile Agreement, supra note 13, arts. 30-31; Bolivia Agreement, supra note 13, arts. 35-
36. The Bolivia Agreement specifically refers to the consideration of the execution of an
agreement regarding the reciprocal promotion and protection of investment. This is the type of
agreement described in the Protocol for the Promotion and Protection of Investments coming
from Non-MERCOSUR Member States. See Protocols Sobre Promocion y Protecci6n de
Inversiones Provencientes de Estados no Portes del Mercosur, MERCOSUR/CM/DEC No.
11/94 and 11/94 Annex, art. 2 [hereinafter Non Member States Protocol], available at http:II
www.mercosur.org.uy/espanol/snor/normativa/ decisiones/DECI 194.htm (last visited Dec. 1,
2003).
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for the exchange of commercial information, promotion of commercial
relations,220 and promotion of industrial, commercial, and technological
harmonization in both economies.22'
c. Management of the Relationship
The management and evaluation of the relationship between MERCOSUR
and Chile and Bolivia is undertaken by an Administrative Commission
composed of representatives of both MERCOSUR and the individual country
involved.222 The Agreements detail a grant to the Administrative Commission
of very extensive responsibilities, both substantive and administrative, for the
management and development of the relationship.223 Their decisions must be
made by consensus.224
Both Agreements provide that any disputes arising between the contracting
parties regarding the interpretation, application, or compliance with the
Agreements shall be resolved through the dispute resolution procedures
adopted therein.225 These procedures shall be applicable for a period of three
years after the effective date of the Agreements, at the end of which the
signatories are to negotiate a new dispute resolution process, which will
include an arbitral process. 26
220 Bolivia Agreement, supra note 13, arts. 30-32.
I' d. arts. 26-29. This process includes the promotion of joint business enterprises, joint
ventures, and multinational enterprises, as well as the creation of managerial agreements for the
production of goods and the rendering of services among public and private enterprises. Id. art.
27. The latter agreements are meant to create new businesses and harmonize, integrate and
rationalize existing industrial enterprises. Id. art. 28.
222 For the Chile relationship, the Administrative Commission is composed of MERCOSUR's
Common Market Group and representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Chile. Chile
Agreement, supra note 13, art. 46. The Administrative Commission for the Bolivia Agreement
is composed of the MERCOSUR Common Market Group and the National Secretariat of
International Economic Relations of the Bolivian Foreign Relations Ministry. Id. art. 39.
2 Chile Agreement, supra note 13, art. 47(a)(1); Bolivia Agreement, supra note 13, art. 40
(1-17).
124 Chile Agreement, supra note 13, art. 46; Bolivia Agreement, supra note 13, art. 39.
22 Chile Agreement, art. 22; Bolivia Agreement, art. 21. These procedures require that any
dispute first be resolved by reciprocal consultation and direct negotiations. Chile Agreement,
supra note 13, at Annex 14, art. 2-4; Bolivia Agreement, supra note 13, at Annex 14, arts. 2-4.
If the dispute is not resolved within thirty days, it can be submitted to the Administrative
Commission for resolution. Id. arts. 5-6. If the Administrative Commission cannot readily
resolve the dispute, it will appoint a Panel of Experts to consider it. The Panel of Experts, once
convened, will then consider the matter and report its conclusions to the Administrative
Commission, which will then make recommendations to the parties. Id. arts. 7-13.
226 Id. art. 14. If the parties cannot come to an agreement regarding such a replacement
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2. The Relationship Continues
As noted above, the parameters of the relationships between MERCOSUR
and Bolivia were reached only after extended and contentious negotiations.
The Bolivian negotiations were apparently especially difficult. The
Bolivian government appeared especially enthusiastic about the relationship,22
apparently because it felt both that a MERCOSUR relationship would be the
best way to attract investment and technology and that it would strengthen its
relationship with Brazil, especially in the energy sector.22' The private sector
appeared to be much less enthusiastic, since it apparently feared competition
from the much stronger economies of Argentina and Brazil and was concerned
that the Bolivian government had made too many concessions in negotiating
the agreement. 229 The negotiations were quite contentious, with disagreements
regarding preferences over agricultural products, competition policy, and
protection for struggling industries.230 Indeed, negotiations were so delayed
that the execution of the Bolivia Agreement, scheduled at the same time as the
Chile agreement in June 1996, had to be postponed for six months.23' The
agreement was finally signed in December 1996, even after last-minute
delays,2 32 and came into effect on January 1, 1997.233
The success of the Bolivia-MERCOSUR relationship is difficult to
evaluate. Clearly, trade between Bolivia and MERCOSUR has substantially
increased. 234  Unlike the case of Chile, there seems to be little, if any,
discussion to date about transforming the Bolivian relationship into full
process within a year, the arbitration procedure set forth in Chapter IV of Brasilia will apply.
Id.
227 Indeed, the President of Bolivia, referred to the new relationship as a"re-encounter," since
"Bolivia was once part of the [United Provinces of the] Rio de la Plata, the Amazon and the
Pacific." Marcela Valente, MERCOSUR: Historic Accords with Chile and Bolivia, Inter Press
Serv., June 26, 1996, at LEXIS, ALLNEWSPLUS Database.
228 Dyer, supra note 194; Rocha, supra note 194.
229 Dyer, supra note 194; Rocha, supra note 194.
2 Dyer, supra note 194; Osava, supra note 194.
233 Comunicado Conjunto de los Presidentes de Los Estados Partes del MERCOSUR, Potrero
de los Funes, Argentina (June 25, 1996), para. 7 [hereinafter Comunicado]; Frayssinet and
Osava, supra note 194.
232 Rocha, supra note 194; Dyer, supra note 194.
233 Bolivia Agreement, supra note 13, art. 47.
234 Sarath Rajapatirana, "Evaluating Bolivia's Choices for Trade Integration," World Bank
Working Paper No. 1632 (1996), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/64 l-wps1632.pdf;
Preliminary Overview of the Economy of Latin America and the Caribbean, U.N. Economic
Commission for Latin America, U.N. Doc. LC/G1984, U.N. Sales No. E.97.11.G.13 (1997)
[hereinafter Preliminary Overview].
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membership in MERCOSUR.23 5 The relationship is still in its early years, and
its development should be watched carefully. The.Bolivian negotiations were
so difficult because Bolivia's economy and industrial infrastructure was much
less developed than those of Chile or the MERCOSUR states. 36 The success
or failure of the integration of Bolivia into the MERCOSUR economic system
is extremely important because it will show whether MERCOSUR can
successfully integrate other less-developed economies into its economic
system and expand beyond its initial members.
37
The Chilean situation was very different. Chile had a very highly
developed economy with substantial exports to the MERCOSUR countries.
These exports tended to be manufactured products, such as computer software
and furniture.23 Chile saw a MERCOSUR relationship as one which would
substantially increase its export markets and establish it as an attractive
investment venue. 239 Furthermore, a relationship with MERCOSUR would be
an indication of Chile's "reinsertion" into Latin America from isolation during
its military regime. 240 Chile was also highly attractive to MERCOSUR as a
link to Asian and Pacific markets.24' The comment has also been made that
Chile's interest in MERCOSUR was also stimulated by the failure of the
United States to grant Chile accession to NAFTA 4 2 The negotiations between
Chile and MERCOSUR were extended over two years, with disagreements
regarding rules of origin, tariff protection of agricultural products, different
tariff rates, and the automobile industry.243
Purely in terms of trade, the MERCOSUR-Chile relationship appears to
have been quite successful. Trade (including Chilean foreign investment)
between Chile and the MERCOSUR countries increased exponentially
23- Compare infra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
236 See, e.g., Andrew Enever, Open Economy Hits Bolivia's Industry, BBC NEws, Apr. 2,
2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1896407.stm; Francisco Bollini Roca,
"Bolivia Logra Salvar el Negocio de la Soya," available at http://www.bolivianet.coffi/artiulos/
asoya.htm; Information on Bolivia's economy, available at http:www.boliviabiz.com/business/
stats.htm.
237 At the time of the Chilean and Bolivian negotiations, negotiations with other ALADI
member states and relationships with the Central American and Caribbean states were being
contemplated. Comunicado, supra note 231, para. 8-9.
238 These exports grew from $1.8 billion in 1990 to $4.5 billion in 1995. O' Keefe, supra note
197, at 3.
239 CHRE-MERCOSUR, supra note 34, at 40-41.
240 Id. at 14, 119, 184.
141 Id. at 107; O'Keefe, supra note 197, at 18-19.
242 O'Keefe, supra note 197, at 3.
243 CHILE-MERCOSUR, supra note 34, at 77-80.
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between 1990 and 1996244 and has continued to increase since then. 245 Both
Chile and MERCOSUR seemed to be quite satisfied with the MERCOSUR
relationship and were discussing Chile's full accession to the community.246
In 2001, however, Chile suspended talks on full membership in MERCOSUR
and announced that it was entering into free-trade negotiations with the United
States.247 In spite of this suspension, the Presidential Declaration made after
the February 18, 2002, meeting of the Council stressed the desire of all parties
to continue negotiations between MERCOSUR, Chile, and Bolivia to
"strengthen the agreements of the integration process. 248 Possible reasons
behind Chile's withdrawal included an unwillingness by Chile to increase its
already low tariff base to meet the MERCOSUR Common External Tariff, or
a calculation that greater gains would be available from membership in a
United States-led free trade zone, such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA).
The latter reason seems to be supported by Chile's signature on June 6,
2003, of a free trade agreement with the United States.2 49 The Chile Free
Trade Agreement constitutes a massive document, with twenty-four chapters,
three Annexes and four Side Letters covering a number of topics.250 The
14 Id. at 79-80.
245 Thomas O'Keefe, The Evolution of Chilean Trade Policy in the Americas: from Lone
Ranger to Team Player, 5 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 251, 254 (1998) ("Since 1990, total bilateral
Chilean trade with the MERCOSUR countries had expanded from U.S. $1.8 billion to almost
U.S. $4.5 billion by 1995 (in 1997 the figure stood at just under U.S. $5 billion.)"). See also
Preliminary Overview, supra note 234.
2' The presidents of Argentina and Chile, in a 2000 joint statement, stressed the opportunity
to begin negotiations aimed at intensifying the process of Chile's full integration into
MERCOSUR. Chile Mucho Mds Cerca del MERCOSUR, LA NACI6N, May 20,2000, available
at http://www.lanacion.com.ar [hereinafter "Chile Mucho Ms Cerca"]. Similarly, in an
interview with the Argentine press in May 2000, the Chilean Foreign Minister described the
Chile-MERCOSUR relationship as one of stages. The first step, she claimed, was economic, and
its goals were achieved. The next stage would be more extensive, and would include many other
areas, including labor, education, and justice. She seemed to feel that the relationship was
broadening, that both parties were extremely interested in having Chile become a full member
of MERCOSUR, and that there were no insurmountable problems to achieving this goal.
Debemos Definir como Enfrentar la Globalizaci,6n LA NACION May 20, 2000, available at
http://www.lanacion.com.ar.
247 Chopping Block, supra note 22; Crossroads, supra note 22.
24 Communicado Conjunto de los Presidentes del MERCOSUR, Bolivia y Chile (Feb. 18,
2002), para. 11 [hereinafter Comunicado Conjunto 2002].
249 U.S, Chile, supra note 22.
20 Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Chile, Final Text, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/
chiusa-e/chiusaind.e.asp (last visited Dec. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Chile Free Trade Agreement].
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principal provisions of this agreement eliminate about eighty-five percent of
all tariffs on consumer and industrial products traded between both countries,
with most remaining tariffs being eliminated in four years.25' Furthermore,
tariffs on about three-quarters of farm goods traded between both countries
will be eliminated within four years, with all such tariffs and quotas phased out
within twelve years.252 Other provisions cover according bilateral free access
to government procurement, 2 3 the telecommunications industry, 25' financial
institutions,2"5 and cross-border trade in services.256 Chile now shares
preferential access to United States markets with Canada, Mexico, Israel, and
Jordan, the only other countries with whom the United States has free trade
agreements.257 It now has the best of all possible worlds. As a MERCOSUR
associate member, Chile's goods have preferential (and eventually tariff-free)
access to the MERCOSUR market, without having to be bound by its common
external tariff.25 On the other hand, it also has preferential access to the
United States market, its largest trading partner.259  Neither relationship
appears to be inconsistent with the other.260
These topics include national treatment and market access for goods, rules of origin, customs
administration, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, trade remedies,
government procurement, investment, cross-border trade in services, financial services,
telecommunications, temporary entry for business persons, electronic commerce, competition
policy, intellectual property rights, labor, environment, transparency, administration, dispute
settlement, and exceptions. Id.
2" U.S. and Chile Conclude Historic Free Trade Agreement, Press Release, Office of the
United States Trade Representative (Dec. 11, 2002) [hereinafter Press Release 12/11/02], at 2,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2002/12/02-114.htm.
252 Id.
23 Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note 250, § 9.2.
254 Id. § 13.2.
255 Id. § 12.2.
256 Id. § 11.2.
257 Press Release 12/11/02, supra note 251, at 1.
2s See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
259 CIA FACTBOOK, supra note 30.
260 Chile did bear one risk in this situation, since the Chile Free Trade Agreement required
ratification by the United States Congress in order to become effective. Chile, U.S., supra note
22. However, the House of Representatives approved the agreement on July 25, 2003, Chile,
Singapore Free-Trade Pacts Pass House, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2003 at A12, and the Senate
approved the agreement on July 31, 2003. Helen Dewar, Senate Approves Chile, Singapore
Trade Pacts, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2003, at E2.
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B. MERCOSUR and the EU
1. Introduction
MERCOSUR has had some relationship with the European Community/EU
almost since the beginning of its existence. An Interinstitutional Cooperation
Agreement was entered into between MERCOSUR and the EU in May 1992
and the EU has provided substantial economic and technical assistance to
MERCOSUR since then.26 This relationship was substantially formalized and
expanded by an Interregional Framework Agreement on Cooperation, which
was signed in December 1995.262
2. The Framework Agreement
The Framework Agreement is a very extensive and ambitious document.
Its objectives are to strengthen existing relations between the Parties and to
prepare the conditions enabling an interregional association to be created.263
These objectives will apparently be achieved through three routes: political
dialogue,2" cooperation in trade and economic matters,2 6' and the encourage-
ment of the process of integration.2" This process clearly constitutes a major
undertaking; a Cooperation Council composed of representatives of
MERCOSUR and the EU is charged by the Framework Agreement with
implementing this process. 7
261 Commission Opinion on Framework Cooperation Agreements between the European
Economic Community and the Republics of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil,
1992 O.J. (C 67) 193. Agreement of Interinstitutional Cooperation between the European
Community and MERCOSUR, May 22, 1992. This agreement appears to have basically covered
funds for technical assistance, instructional seminars, and other similar informal contacts. See
MERCOSUR/GMC/Res 09/93, available at http:HIwww.sice.oas.orgltradelmrcsr/merco-euIM_
EU.el .asp; THE EU'S RELATIONS wrrH MERCOSUR-OVERVIEW, available at http://www.
europa.eu.int/comni/extemaL-relations/mercosur/intro [hereinafter EU OVERvIEW 2001].
262 Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and
its Member States, of the one part, and the Southern Common Market and its Party States, of the
other part, Dec. 15, 1995, available at http://europa.eu.int/commextemal.relations/mercosur/
bacground-doc/fca96.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Framework Agreement].
" Id. art. 2(1). These seem to include trade and economic matters, cooperation regarding
integration, and other fields of mutual interest. See id. art. 2(2).
264 Id. art. 3.
265 Id. arts. 4-17.
2" Id. art. 18.
267 Id. arts. 25-30.
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The political dialogue described by the Framework Agreement is based on
a number of basic political principles which the parties jointly support.268
MIERCOSUR and the EU are to conduct this political dialogue by means of
contacts, information exchanges and consultation, including regular meetings
between the MERCOSUR heads of state and the highest authorities in the EU,
yearly meetings of the ministers of foreign affairs of MERCOSUR, the EU
member states and the European Commission, and other periodic meetings of
ministerial and other senior officials. 2
69
Cooperation on trade matters seems, however, to be the principal purpose
of the Framework Agreement. The objective is to have the parties engage in
a process of crafting closer relations with each other, with the purpose of
encouraging the increase and diversification of trade. This process is to lead
to the "subsequent gradual and reciprocal liberalization of trade" and will
promote "conditions which are conducive to the establishment of the
Interregional Association."27  There is no indication in the Framework
Agreement itself of what the characteristics of the "Interregional Association"
are going to be, or when it is to be completed.27' This process is clearly going
26' These include such principles as "political and economic freedoms are fundamental to
society," "reaffirming human dignity and the promotion of human rights as cornerstones of a
democratic society," "reaffirming the essential role of the principles and democratic institutions
based on the rule of law," "desiring to strengthen international peace and security in accordance
with the principles of the United Nations Charter," and "sharing an interest in regional
integration as a means of enabling their citizens to achieve sustainable and harmonious
development predicated upon social progress and solidarity between their members." Id. at Joint
Declaration on Political Dialogue between the European Union and MERCOSUR [hereinafter
Joint Declaration].
269 Id. art. 3; Joint Declaration, Mechanisms of the Dialogue. There have been three EU-
MERCOSUR ministerial meetings regarding political dialogue: Panama, February 1998;
Vilamoura, Portugal, February 2000; Santiago, Chile, March 2001. EU OVERVIEw 2001, supra
note 261, at 3. In the February 2000 meeting, for example, the ministers presented a
"Declaration and Action Programme for Political Cooperation," which identified the main areas
of political dialogue to include, interalia, peace and security prevention of conflicts, confidence
and security-building measures, promotion and protection of human rights, and democracy and
the rule of law. Joint Press Release, Ministerial Meeting between the European Union, the
MERCOSUR, Chile and Bolivia (Feb. 23, 2000), at para. 4, available at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/extemal.relations/mercosur/ass-neg/text/press-rel-vila.htm. Mostly, the ministers agreed
to continue their dialogue and reinforce the coordination among themselves. Draft Joint
Declaration, supra note 268, arts. 5-8.
270 Framework Agreement, supra note 262, art. 4.
27 The then-President of Argentina, Carlos Menem, declared in 1996 that all trade barriers
between MERCOSUR and the EU should be dismantled by the year 2005.
EUIARGENTINAIMERCOSUR: Free Trade Agreement by the Year 2005, European Report,
June 12, 1996, available at LEXIS, ALLNEWSPLUS Database. As shall be seen below, given
the pace of the negotiations to date, this timetable may be premature.
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to cover almost every economic sector, including agri-food and industrial
standards and certification, 272 customs matters 27 3 statistical matters,2 74
2752 277intellectual property,  economic cooperation,276 business cooperation,
278 279 280investment promotion, ' energy cooperation, transport cooperation,
science and technology cooperation,28' telecommunications and information
technology,28 2 and environmental protection.8 3 The examination of each of
these topics is clearly going to be quite extensive and exhaustive and is to be
the subject of very involved negotiations.2 4
Encouraging the process of integration is to occur through cooperation
between all parties in all of the areas of the Framework Agreement. 25 This
cooperation is apparently envisioned to occur through four venues: information
exchange, 86 training and institutional backing, 8 7 studies and joint projects,88
and technical assistance.8 9
The negotiations and consultations envisioned in the Framework Agree-
ment are to be undertaken under the direction of a Cooperation Council,
composed of members of the EU Council and Commission and members of the
272 Framework Agreement, supra note 262, art. 6.
273 Id. art. 7.
274 Id. art. 8.
275 Id. art. 9.
276 Id. arts. 10-17.
277 Id. art. 11.
278 Id. art. 12.
279 Id. art. 13.
280 Id. art. 14.
281 Id. art. 15.
282 Id. art. 16.
283 Id. art. 17.
284 In the area of "business cooperation," for example, the areas to be focused upon include,
inter alia, "increasing the flow of trade, investment"; "industrial cooperation projects and
technology transfer"; "encouraging modernization and diversification in industry"; identifying
and eliminating barriers to industrial cooperation; "promoting industrial innovation"; and
stimulating cooperation between economic operators, especially small- and medium-sized
enterprises. Id. art. 11(2). A tall order indeed.
285 Id. art. 18.
286 Id. arts. 18(3)(a), 19, 21.
287 Id. arts. 18(3)(b), 20.
288 Id. arts. 18(3)(c).
289 Id. arts. 18(3)(d), 24. An example of this "technical cooperation" is the Financing
Agreement between the European Union and the Mercosur Countries (Statistical Cooperation
with the Mercosur Countries) MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC No. 23/97, available at http://www.
mercosur.org.uy/espanol/snor/normativa/decisions/1997/9723.htm. This agreement provides for
an EU contribution of 4,135,000 ECUs for statistical cooperation with the MERCOSUR
countries. id. art. 2.
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MERCOSUR Council and Common Market Group. It is chaired, in turn, by
a representative of the EU and a representative of MERCOSUR and creates its
own rules of procedure.'zg The Cooperation Council is to be assisted by a Joint
Cooperation Committee composed of representatives of the member states of
the EU and MERCOSUR. They are to meet at least on a yearly basis and are
to assist the Cooperation Council in the performance of its duties. The Council
may delegate "all or part of its powers" to the Committee, with the thought that
the Committee "shall provide continuity between meetings of the Cooperation
Council."'29' The Framework Agreement also creates a Joint Subcommittee on
Trade, composed of representatives of the EU and MERCOSUR, which is
meant to "conduct the preparatory work for the subsequent liberalization of
trade" envisioned therein.292 In short, three major organizations are expected
to negotiate this relationship.
3. The EU-MERCOSUR Negotiations
The negotiations between the EU and MERCOSUR contemplated by the
Framework Agreement have been quite extensive. The Cooperation Council
first met in Brussels in November 1999.293 Its principal action was to create
a Biregional Negotiations Committee (BNC) (whose membership was
unspecified), which was to be responsible for the "general oversight and
management of the negotiations on trade matters and cooperation '294 between
the parties. The meeting also created a Subcommittee on Cooperation, which
was to "conduct negotiations on co-operation ' 295 and report directly to the
BNC. The BNC was also given the power to create Technical Groups, also
directly responsible to it, to examine particular topics forming part of the trade
290 Framework Agreement, supra note 262, art. 25-26. The Council "may decide to set up
any other body to assist it in the performance of its duties." Id. art. 28. Several such bodies have
been created, including a Biregional Negotiations Committee, three subgroups on specific
cooperation areas, and three technical groups dealing with trade matters. See infra note 402 and
accompanying text.
291 Framework Agreement, supra note 262, art. 27. In particular, the Committee is to make
proposals to the Council "with the aim of stimulating preparations for the liberalization of trade
and of intensifying cooperation," and making "proposals which contribute to achieving the
ultimate aim of [the] EU-MERCOSUR Interregional Association." Id. arts. 27(5)(c),(d).
292 Id. art. 29.
293 Joint Press Release, EU-MERCOSUR, First Cooperation Council (Nov. 1999), available
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal-relations/mercosur/ass-neg-text/pressrel-coop.htm
[hereinafter JPR-FCC].




negotiations. 2' The BNC, which had the authority to decide its calendar and
agenda, would plan to meet at least three times a year.297 It would also report
to the Cooperation Council (who apparently still had the ultimate power to
make actual recommendations to the parties under the Framework Agreement)
298on a regular basis.
The BNC first met in Argentina in April 2000.299 There, the parties created
and generally described the charge of three different subgroups on
cooperation 3°° and three different technical groups.30' The parties also agreed
on an extensive program of information exchange between MERCOSUR and
EU officials, and agreed on the agenda for their next meeting.302 The next
meeting of the BNC chiefly resulted in the exchange of information among the
parties and in beginning discussions on a number of topics.30 3 This process
continued through the third meeting of the BNC, with the parties considering
that enough progress had been made to enable the exchange of draft negotiat-
ing texts on a number of issues to occur in the near future. °"
296 Id.
29' Id. at Annex 2, § 3.
298 Id. at Annex 2, § 2.
299 First Meeting of the EU-MERCOSUR Biregional Negotiations Committee (Apr. 6-7,
2000, Buenos Aires, Argentina), available at http://europa.eu.int/commlextemaLrelations/
mercosur/ass-neg-text/conclbncl.htm [hereinafter First BNC].
30 These were the Subgroup on Economic Cooperation (charged with, inter alia, industrial
cooperation, cooperation in the field of services, and investment promotion), the Subgroup on
Social and Cultural Cooperation (charged, with, inter alia, social cooperation, cultural
cooperation, social dialogue, and drugs and related organized crime), and the Subgroup on
Financial and Technical Cooperation (charged with, inter alia, public administration
modernization and inter institutional cooperation. Id. at §§ 3.2-3.3.
"0 Technical Group I includes, interalia, trade in goods (both tariff and non-tariff measures),
antidumping and countervailing duties, and safeguards and rules of origin. Technical Group 2
includes, inter alia, trade in services and intellectual property rights. Technical Group 3 includes
government procurement, competition and dispute settlement. Id. § 4.2.1.
32 Id. §§ 4.2.2-4.2.3. They also agreed that, at the end of each meeting, they would set the
specific agenda of the next meeting. Id.
303 Second Meeting of the EU-MERCOSUR Biregional Negotiations Committee (June 13-16,
2000, Brussels, Belgium) §§ 2-5, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external.relations/
mercosur/ass-neg.text/conclbnc2.htm [hereinafter Second BNC].
11 This meeting was held at Brasilia, Brasil, on Nov. 7-10, 2000. THIRD MEETING OF THE
EU-MERCOSUR B[REGIONAL NEGOTIATIONS COMMITrEE (NOVEMBER 7-10, 2000, BRASMIA,
BRAsu.) [hereinafter Third BNC], available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemaLrelations/
mercosur/ass-neg-text/concl-bnc3.htm. At this meeting, for example, enough consensus was
found to have the parties prepare ajoint text on the preamble, the legal framework of the political
dialogue, and various paragraphs of the institutional structure of the future Association
Agreement. Id. § 2. See also EU set to Make Progress with MERCOSUR in Fourth Round of
Association Negotiations, Memo 01/91 (Mar. 16, 2001, Brussels, Belgium), available at http:II
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The fifth meeting of the BNC was held in July 2001. In that meeting,
MERCOSUR, in response to an EC proposal, presented tariff offers and
negotiating texts for goods, services, and government procurement.
30 5
Negotiations on political dialogue and cooperation continued 30 6 and seven draft
texts in a number of areas were agreed to. This process of discussions, review
of drafts, and further negotiation has continued in the most recent meetings of
the BNC.3°7
A meeting of the heads of state of MERCOSUR and the EU was held in
May 2002, and a ministerial meeting was held in March 2003.308 At those
meetings, the participants lauded that substantial progress had been made in
political, institutional and economic trade matter by the BNC3°9 and vowed to
europa.eu.int/comm/extemal-relations/mercosur/intro/mem_0191 .htm.
305 Fifth Meeting of the EU-MERCOSUR Biregional Negotiations Committee (July 2-6,
2001, Montevideo, Uruguay), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal-relations/
mcrcosur/ass.neg.text/bnc5/conclusions.htm. By the next meeting, the parties were discussing
a draft text on the institutional framework of the future agreement and presented and discussed
text proposals on a number of areas related to economic cooperation and social and cultural
cooperation. At the meeting, the EU presented to MERCOSUR an extensive offer dealing with
both tariff and non-tariff matters, including negotiating texts dealing with goods, services and
government procurement. The purpose of this offer, according to the EU, was to substantially
and progressively liberalize substantially, all trade, without excluding any sector, during a period
oftenyears. The MERCOSUR representatives indicated that they would be presenting their own
negotiating proposals covering these areas in the near future. Proposals were also exchanged in
the areas of cooperation in the agricultural and rural sector, which will be analyzed in the next
BNC meeting. On the other hand, the three different Subgroups agreed on joint draft texts in a
number of areas. Conclusions of the Sixth EU-MERCOSUR Biregional Negotiations Committee
(Brussels, Oct. 29-31,2001), para. 1, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal- relations/
mercosur/ass-neg-text/bnc6.htm.
I Id. para. 2-3. Another round of meetings were held in Buenos Aires, Argentina (April
2002), Brussels, Belgium (November 2002) and again in Buenos Aires, Argentina (March 2003).
See Seventh Meeting of the EU-MERCOSUR Biregional Negotiations Committee (Buenos
Aires, Apr. 8-11, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal-relations
mercosur/ass-neg-text/bnc7.htm; Eighth Meeting of the EU-MERCOSUR Biregional
Negotiations Committee (Nov. 15, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external
relations/mercosur/ass-neg__ text/ip02-l684.htm; Meeting of the Ninth EU-MERCOSUR
Biregional Negotiations Committee (Brussels, Mar. 17-21,2003), available at http://europa.eu.
int/commlexternalrelations/ mercosur/ass-neg-text/bnc9.htm.
" Id. The areas included scientific and technological cooperation, energy, transport,
telecommunication, information technology and information society. Id.
308 Joint Communiqud, Second Meeting of Heads of State and of Government of the EU and
of MERCOSUR, available athttp://europa.eu.intlcomnlextemal-relationsmercosur/ass-neg-
text/ma05O2.htm (May 17, 2002 Madrid, Spain) [hereinafter Madrid Communique]; Joint
Communiqud, Bolivia-Chile Ministerial Meeting (Mar. 27, 2003, Athens, Greece), available at
http://europa.eu.int/commlexternal-relations/mercosur/intro/mm27-0303.htm.
' Madrid Comunique, supra note 308, para. 2-7.
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continue negotiations towards the ultimate objective of the "achievement of
further effective access to their respective markets, on the basis of progressive
and reciprocal trade liberalization in accordance with GATT/WTO rules."31
They also welcomed a new plan of action on business facilitation3 ' and
announced the commencement of negotiations on wine and spirits.1 2 This
meeting was similarly lauded by the MERCOSUR presidents.
3'3
These negotiations appear thus far headed to a mutually agreeable
conclusion. As noted above, as part of its relationship with the EU,
MERCOSUR has thus far received substantial amounts of financial assistance
meant to be used for the development of its institutions. This financing, and
the substantial "technical assistance" provided by the EU and its institutions
to date, could substantially change the organization and operation of
MERCOSUR's institutions in the future. Furthermore, a successful comple-
tion of these negotiations could mean a highly advantageous entry for
MERCOSUR goods into the European market, a state of affairs that could
make MERCOSUR far more attractive to other potential members and which
could result in more potential applications for membership. This situation
could place MERCOSUR in a similar dilemma to that faced by the EU until
recently: how to substantially increase the size and membership of the
organization without sacrificing its effectiveness and efficiency.
IV. SUCCESS, PROBLEMS, AND THE FUTURE OF MERCOSUR
At the end of this detailed examination of MERCOSUR's history, structure,
and legal system, a basic question remains to be considered. That question is
whether MERCOSUR is successful, or likely to be successful, in the future,
perhaps to the degree that it rivals, or even competes with, the EU, presently
the preeminent lEO in the world. Stated differently, is MERCOSUR (or is it
likely to be) the "Common Market of the Twenty-First Century?"
310 Id. para. 8.
31, EU-MERCOSUR Action Plan on Business Facilitation (May. 16, 2002), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comnn/trade/bilateral/mercosur/eum-apbf.htm. This Plan was to
intentionally focus on questions of customs, standards, regulations and conformity assessment,
sanitary and phytosanitary measures and had the aim of increasing trade flows and facilitating
or eliminating potential barriers to trade. Madrid Comunique, supra note 308, para. 12.
312 Madrid Comunique, supra note 308, para. 12.
33 Comunicado Conjunto de los Presidentes de los Estados Partes del MERCOSUR, July 5,
2002 [hereinafter Comunicado July 2002], at para. 25-27, available at http://www.mercosur.
org.04/paginal esp.htm.
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Determining what constitutes "success" in an lEO like MERCOSUR
involves a complex analysis. We must first understand why a nation would
form part of (and remain in) an EO like MERCOSUR instead of remaining an
independent trader or entering into more ad hoc and temporary trading
arrangements with other individual nations, groups of nations, or other EOs.
Once we have some basic understanding of this concept, we must then
understand something of the nature of the EO itself, in order to enumerate and
examine other criteria that might serve as indicia of "success."
A. An Analytical Framework for IEOs
This analysis is considerably aided by the work of Professor Joel
Trachtman, who has designed an analytical framework and theory regarding
the IEO.314 Professor Trachtman starts from the assumption that individuals
and states acting in the international arena generally act in their own self-
interest, 315 and that these international interactions operate in the form of a
market.316 This market can, in fact, be described as a continuum, ranging from
"spot market transactions" through many types of contracts and informal
arrangements to formal organizations such as IEOs.3" 7 The assets traded in this
market are not goods or services, but components of power. 31" These
transactions can range from informal, occasional "spot" transactions between
one or two individual states to more formalized, permanent agreements
314 Joel P. Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of International Economic
Organization: Toward Comparative InstitutionalAnalysis, 17 Nw. J. INT'LL. & Bus. 470 (1996-
1997) [hereinafter Theory of the Firm].
3" Id. at 482.
316 Id. at 487.
317 Jeffrey L. Dunoff& Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis ofInternational Law, 24 YALE
J. INT'LL. 1, 17-18.
31" Theory of the Firm, supra note 314, at 498. Trachtman describes three types of goods that
may be traded: private goods, domestic public goods and international public goods. Economists
define public goods as those which have two characteristics, non-exclusivity and non-rivalry.
Non-exclusivity describes goods where the cost of preventing their use by persons other than the
owner are too great to be worthwhile. Non-rivalry describes goods whose consumption by one
person does not diminish their availability to others. At the domestic level, these goods include
infrastructure services, police services, national security services and all manner of law and
regulation, including trade regulation. International public goods can include international law,
regulation, or international organizations. Id. at 490-01. In the legal context, Trachtman more
narrowly describes this power as jurisdiction, including jurisdiction to prescribe, adjudicate and
enforce. He also adds that, in international society, the equivalent of the market is simply the
place where states interact to cooperate on particular issues in order to maximize their interests
and preferences. Id. at 498.
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involving multiple interactions over a lengthy period of time.319 States enter
this market because they seek to obtain benefits (such as favorable trade terms)
that they cannot obtain otherwise and enter into these exchanges in order to
obtain gains therefrom. Indeed, states will "trade" in this market as long as
their net gains from this trade exceed their related losses and transaction
costs.320 If these exchanges result in no gains, then there is no incentive to
participate, and thus, no incentive for trade, cooperation, or integration. 32'
In this analysis, an EO represents an attempt to "institutionalize" this
"market" by negotiating and creating a "template" through which states can
agree in advance to permit certain types of transactions, thereby minimizing
the costs of negotiating and implementing individual trade transactions and
maximizing their gains therefrom.3 22  An implied precondition of this
"institutionalization" is that there must already be some "market" (that is, some
existing trade relationship) to "institutionalize." In an lEO, states are
contracting with each other to establish rules for the benefit of the private
economic actors that engage in trading. These rules significantly reduce the
risk of arbitrary and unpredictable government action in trading and enable
states participating in an LEO and trading actors to have some degree of
regulatory predictability in trade.3
23
These entities exist in a competitive environment. They compete against
other IEOs, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multinational firms, or
states themselves. The business firm prevails against its competition by
making more profits. IEOs compete for responsibility. The more responsibil-
ity over transactions, economic sectors, areas of regulation, territory, and
nation-states, the more funding and rulemaking authority they will require to
adequately implement their responsibility, and the more successful they will
be.324 They are vehicles of state collusion. States engage in a competition for
319 Id. at 499-500.
320 Trachtman describes this relationship in the formula NG= TG-(TL+TC). Id. at 553.
321 id. at 489, 553. Determining these gains requires an understanding and analysis of the
principal gains and costs inherent in these transactions, which Trachtman describes in detail. See
id. at 499-510, 515-32.
322 Id. at 496-99. Trachtman notes that, the more institutionalized these arrangements
become, the more the arrangement resembles the workings of a firm, rather than the workings
of a market, especially when these arrangements have longer terms, cover more transactions, are
more complex, or provide for decision-making in the future other than by unanimous consent.
Trachtman then asserts that the theory of the firm is useful and appropriate in analyzing the
workings of the lEO. Id. at 499.
323 Jose E. Alvarez & Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating the World Trade Organization, 96 AM.
J. INT'L L. 28, 42 (2002).
324 Theory of the Firm, supra note 314, at 519.
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the provision of public goods. When they collude, they may make "spot"
transactions for power, enter into longer-term agreements to transact in power
in the future, or form IEOs, without knowing in advance what transactions will
be made by these institutions that they are creating.325 Once states enter into
an EO and make the structural changes required to implement its mandate,
then it is very hard for them to return to their prior state.
The relationship between member states and an EO is similar to that of a
shareholder and his or her firm.326 In order to further the purposes of the
organization, the state delegates to the organization some of its rights to
control some of its affairs. It generally retains, however, the right to residual
control over those of its affairs that have remained unassigned to the IEO.
This takes two forms: retained domestic sovereignty and the right to consent
to any new rule or norm that might emanate from the lEO.327 Depending on
the organization, it may also retain the right to leave, and the ease of exit from
the organization may make it more attractive to potential members and induce
them to delegate more powers to the organization.328 As is the case with
shareholders investing in corporations, states joining and participating in an
EO do so because they believe that they will gain more from participation
than from non-participation.329
The question of what responsibilities over what subject matters the
members of the lEO will delegate or allocate to the organization itself is, of
course, critical. Its answer depends on whether the "allocation" itself is more
valuable in the hands of the lEO or in the hands of the member state.330 This
allocation issue generally manifests itself in the distribution of powers and
responsibilities between the institutions of the EO and its members. The
assumption is that, while the EO has been delegated some plenary powers
(generally with limitations) by its members, the latter retain all remaining
plenary powers. The questions of what those delegated powers will be and how
325 Id.
326 Id. at 509. In a corporation, Trachtman asserts, shareholders retain two types of residual
rights: the right to residual value upon liquidation of the firm and the right to residual control.
The latter is, to the degree that the rights to control have not been contracted away by either the
shareholders or the corporation, the shareholders retain the authority and power to act as they
determine. Id.
327 Id.
328 Id. at 512.
329 Id. at 498-503, 510-21.
330 Id. at 530. Trachtman notes that "value" must be understood in this context as "the ability
to satisfy state preferences at the lowest cost." In other words, the "option" will be bought by
the participant (the IEO or the states) that can "make most efficient use of the responsibilities to
satisfy the preferences expressed at that level of government." Id.
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(and by whom) they are exercised, as well as the existence of any residual
powers and location, are critical design issues on which the effectiveness of the
organization may depend.33' This makes the existence of an adequate and
effective dispute resolution mechanism an essential component of an EO.
States are more likely to join an IEO and delegate it more plenary powers,
especially the power to formulate and implement policy without requiring
unanimous member-state consent for each decision, if the organization has a
dispute resolution mechanism that is viewed as prompt, effective, and fair. In
Trachtman's words, an inadequate dispute resolution system in an EO
increases its participants' transaction costs and reduces their transaction gains,
therefore making participation less desirable.
332
The bottom line is therefore twofold. First, from the point of view of the
state actors in the international arena, membership and participation in an EO
is desirable as long as their gains from participation (taking into account all
transaction costs and losses, of course) exceed their gains from
nonparticipation.333 Second, from the point of view of the organization itself,
there appear to be two critical measures of success: the growth in the organiza-
tion's responsibility334 and its pareto efficiency.335
B. Is MERCOSUR a Success?
As was clearly shown above, this analysis of an EO is extremely hard to
quantify. Indeed, Trachtman's formula seems to be best applied to the
evaluation of specific EO policies or characteristics, rather than to the IEO in
general.336 However, this analysis gives us an important theoretical framework
"3 Id. at 534-35. In the case of the EU, Trachtman believes that the location of this residual
authority is somewhat blurred because of "the tension between the limited purposes of the
European Union and the rather unlimited legislative authority needed to achieve those purposes."
Id. Further complicating the issue is the concept of subsidiarity, enshrined in Article 3b of the
Treaty on European Union, which states that, in areas not falling within its exclusive
competence, the EU shall take action only "and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states and can therefore.., be better achieved
by the Community." TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 3b, O.J.C. 224/1 (1992).
332 See Theory of the Firm, supra note 314, at 527-29, 549-52.
333 See supra note 320 and accompanying text. See also Jose E. Alvarez & Joel P.
Trachtman, Institutional Linkage: Transcending "Trade and..." 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 77, 85
(2002).
334 Theory of the Firm, supra note 314.
33' An lEO is pareto efficient if the members unanimously accept and abide by the general
rules under which its operates. Id. at 516. This state is, however, not easily quantifiable. Id. at
518.
336 See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
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and a number of frames of reference for evaluating MERCOSUR. Specifi-
cally, let us look at some of the indicia of growth, increasing responsibility,
and pareto efficiency. These include:
- Why does MERCOSUR appear to be more successful in setting
and creating norms than its predecessors?
- What are the feelings of public and private actors within the
member states toward the organization?
- Has there been an increase in the number of states that have
wished to join MERCOSUR? Were their applications wel-
come? Were they successful? Are more applications forthcom-
ing?
- Has there been any increase in trade among its members, or
among its members and other trading parties?
- Have the members and MERCOSUR been able to agree on
norms to be applied by the organization?
- Has the existence of MERCOSUR increased the number of
trade disputes avoided or resolved among its members?
- Do the members generally comply with the organization's
norms?
- Does MERCOSUR have clear plans for the future and the
ability to implement them?
- Does it appear to the member states that they are better off
remaining in MERCOSUR than leaving it?
Let us now consider some of these factors.
1. Formalizing Existing Relations
To begin with, there is a very clear distinction between MERCOSUR and
its predecessors. As we have seen earlier, a principal disadvantage of
MERCOSUR's predecessor, LAFTA, is that the majority of its members had
little or no trading relationships with each other, which made tariff-reduction
agreements more of a theoretical and aspirational exercise.337 This made
agreement and cooperation among the LAFTA members (many of whom had
vastly different economies and little or no trading relationships with other
Latin American countries), required to create an institutionalized free-trade
area or common market, virtually impossible. An IEO cannot successfully
... See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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"institutionalize" a "market" of trading relationships where there are no trading
relationships in existence. MERCOSUR is an organization that was built on
existing transactions and relationships among traders in its members. It was
created to institutionalize a series of already existing "spot transactions"
among the states who were to become its members. Furthermore, the states
with the two largest economies in the group, Argentina and Brazil, had already
started a very successful process of institutionalizing joint economic and
trading relationships with each other,338 thus creating momentum for greater
integration. The economies of Uruguay and Paraguay, the other two original
participants in MERCOSUR, were already closely tied to those of Argentina
and Brazil.339 At its founding, MERCOSUR was thus somewhat more
advanced in Trachtman's and Dunoff s international trade continuum 3' than
its predecessors.
2. Elite Support of the Venture
The increased trade, economic prosperity, and apparently successful
economic integration efforts between Argentina and Brazil between 1985 and
1990 were, of course, part of the worldwide globalization phenomenon,
through which economic protectionism and isolationism were giving way to
free trade and global economic integration.34' These events resulted in
significant economic prosperity for Argentina and Brazil342 and, according to
a survey, were perceived very favorably by the economic, political, and
cultural elites of Brazil and Argentina.343 These elite actors, leaders of the
333 See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text. These joint Argentine-Brazilian
integrations had already increased trading relationships and exports between these two countries.
See COFFEY, supra note 33, at 33-38. See also Antoni Estevadeordal et al., The New
Regionalism in the Americas: The Case of MERCOSUR, INTAL Working Papers (Apr. 2000),
available at http://www.iadb.org/intal [hereinafter THE NEW REGIONAUSM].
33' Forty percent of total exports from Paraguay and Uruguay total exports go to
MERCOSUR markets. Periodic Note on Integration, Division of Integration, Trade and
Hemisphere Issues, Inter-American Development Bank, available at http://www.iadb.org/int/
intpub/nota/nota-en.pdf (last visited Dec. 7, 2003).
31 See Theory of the Firm, supra note 314 and accompanying text.
341 "The world is undergoing a second wave of regionalism.., we have witnessed many
successful attempts to form integrated trading areas all over the world since the mid-80s ... ,"
including: Europe-EC92; Asia and Pacific-Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); North
America-NAFTA; Latin America-MERCOSUR and FTAA. THE NEW REGIONALISM, supra
note 338.
342 COFFEY, supra note 33, at 33-38.
" Diego Achard et al., Las Elites Argentinas y Brasileiras frente al Mercosur, Banco
Interamericano de Desarrollo, Instituto para ]a Integracion de America Latina (BID/INTAL) Pub.
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public and private sectors in their countries, greatly influence public opinion
and government policy. Indeed, a substantial majority of these actors felt very
positive towards Latin American integration because it was perceived as
bringing economic benefits and being the first step towards political integra-
tion.344 In spite of the fact that only one-third of the elites who participated in
the study were consulted directly or indirectly in the process that resulted in
MERCOSUR,345 sentiment towards MERCOSUR among the Brazilian and
Argentine elites was overwhelmingly positive.346  Strong support for
MERCOSUR among these elites makes it easier for their states to accept,
enact, and implement the organization's agenda and norms.
The same individuals interviewed felt that MERCOSUR had a high
probability of success347 and felt that this success would help make the
Southern Cone region more competitive globally. 38 The perception was that
MERCOSUR's major advantages would be economic (increased trade with
fewer barriers and economic complementarity), and that the impact of these
changes would be positive, both short-term and long-term.349 It would result
in a larger, more protected market for the area's products.35 These changes
would also bring technological advances, which would make their products
more competitive.3' The increasing and substantial prosperity in the
MERCOSUR economies validated and reinforced these positive perceptions
and feelings. An important question to consider (the answer to which might
be impossible to ascertain) is whether these positive perceptions and feelings
on the part of the respondents would have existed in the absence of this
substantial prosperity. In order to achieve these advantages, the participants
noted that they would tolerate some short-term economic changes, including
short-term unemployment and the elimination of certain industrial sectors in
their economies.3 52
The majority of the respondents, therefore, felt that participation in
MERCOSUR would clearly make their countries better off economically. In
order to achieve the organization's potential, they would support an organiza-
418, at 7, 16-27 (1994) [hereinafter Elites].
144 Id. at 83-84.
146 Id. at 81.
347 id. at 89-90.
348 Id. at 97.
'49 Id. at 83-84, 86-90.
330 Id. at 88.
31 Id. at 89.
312 Id. at 80, 89.
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tion that had supranational aspects and characteristics and that served as the
creator and manager of a free-trade zone or a common market.353 In other
words, they would be willing to give up some state-specific advantages for the
benefit of the MERCOSUR integration process. Furthermore, they would be
willing to aggressively and enthusiastically work towards expeditiously
furthering the MERCOSUR agenda.
The major obstacles to the success of MERCOSUR were thought to be the
ability of the member states to engage in the coordination of macroeconomic
policies and the possibility of a coup d'etat in one of the member states.
Interestingly, none of the respondents felt that there would be much of a
problem in having the members agree on a common external tariff, which was
the problem that doomed LAFTA.354
An overwhelming sentiment to be extracted from this study is that, with
regard to the political and economic elites of Argentina and Brazil (and, to a
lesser extent, to those of Paraguay and Uruguay), they (and by extrapolation,
their countries) would be better off in participating in MERCOSUR than in not
doing so. This was the case because a MERCOSUR whose norms and
programs decreased trade barriers, and otherwise stimulated trade and
economic integration, would bring forth economic prosperity.
A critical point to remember is that, although the majority of the partici-
pants felt that their countries would or could accept significant economic
sacrifices in the name of integration, this acceptance of economic sacrifice has
a limit.355 Indeed, the unspoken implication from these comments seemed to
be that, if MERCOSUR's economic integration resulted in substantial
economic difficulties for an extended period of time, then support for
MERCOSUR would be substantially diminished.
If, for some reason, the economies of the MERCOSUR countries found
themselves in an extended substantial economic downturn, crisis, or recession,
these attitudes and actions of the respondents, and of the nations they lead,
could change substantially. MERCOSUR, and its norms and programs, might
not bring forth economic prosperity. Specifically, giving up state-specific
trade advantages, in the form of barriers or otherwise, would become
disadvantageous rather than advantageous. Since further implementation or
expansion of the MERCOSUR agenda and norms would not bring forth
economic benefits, there would be no incentive for aggressively working
towards this end. Taking this position to its logical extreme, participating in
353 Id. at 84-85, 169-71.
314 Id. at 90. See also supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
31' Elites, supra note 343, at 81.
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MERCOSUR might not bring any further economic gains. Indeed, there might
be more losses than gains for the member state participating in MERCOSUR
That might have been the calculus that Chile engaged in when it decided not
to seek full membership in MERCOSUR, but instead to seek a free-trade
arrangement with the United States. 356 As shall be seen below, given the
recent and current economic difficulties in Argentina and Brazil, this scenario
might be very feasible at the present time.
3. Paradise Lost: Brazil's Economic Difficulties
Between 1990 and 1997, trade among the MERCOSUR member states
increased dramatically. In these seven years, MERCOSUR became the third
largest trading bloc in the world, after the EU and NAFTA. 357 Trade and
investment between Argentina and Brazil had quadrupled, and a substantial
interdependence between the economies of both countries had developed.358
Indeed, at this point, things were going so well that the idea of a monetary
union was being discussed.359
In late 1998, things changed. A major recession in Brazil resulted in the
devaluation of Brazil's currency, the Real, in January 1999. As a result,
Argentine goods became more expensive and Brazilian goods less so. The
cross-investments and interdependence between the Brazilian and Argentine
economies spread the effects of this recession and devaluation to Argentina.
The fear was that Argentine investors would increase their investment in Brazil
and that Argentine consumers would flock to purchase Brazilian products,
severely affecting the Argentine economy. This fear aroused the ire of the
Argentine government and business sectors, and affected the Argentine
economy.3 °
356 MERCOSUR Chopping Block, supra note 22, at 40; Crossroads, supra note 22, at A15.
... Rivals, supra note 9.
311 Keep it in the Neighborhood, supra note 8.
3" Rivals, supra note 9; Sebastian Edwards, How About a Single Currency for
MERCOSUR?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 1998, at A 1l. As a matter of fact, one commentator was
arguing that the new single currency should be based on the system of currency board and dollar
parity then in use in Argentina. Rivals, supra note 9.
360 Breaking Point, supra note 17; Devaluation Slows Trade with MERCOSUR Partners
(excerpted from Gazeta Mercantil, Mar. 28, 1999, BBC SUMMARY OFWORLD BROADCASTS, Apr.
6, 1999, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com); Tim McGirk, MERCOSUR Blues: Cardoso 's
problems in Brazil are creating big trade troubles, especially for Argentina's Menem, TIME
INT'L, Mar. 8, 1999, at 26; MERCOSUR Becalmed, ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 1999, at 34; Sour
MERCOSUR, supra note 17. There is some evidence, however, that the effect on the Argentine
economy of the Brazilian difficulties was much less severe than feared. See Arturo O'Connell,
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This situation had an immediate effect on MERCOSUR. As noted above,
Argentina felt the need to become protectionist in its trade relations with
Brazil, and immediately imposed import quotas for textiles and extensive
technical requirements for imported electrical appliances, and asserted that it
was considering the imposition of "safeguards" against imported shoes and
paper.36' Subsequently, Brazil negotiated and completed a trade agreement
with the Andean countries. After personal conversations between both
presidents, Argentina agreed to temporarily suspend the quotas. An emergency
meeting of the MERCOSUR ministers in August 1999 was unable to defuse
the dispute. By the end of the year, relations between Argentina and Brazil
were "at a breaking point.
' '161
This poor relationship between MERCOSUR's major partners continued
through 2001. Argentina viewed MERCOSUR as detrimental to its economy,
and it became uncooperative in MERCOSUR matters. 3  A number of
controversies were brought by several member states before the Group within
a six-month period in 2001.365 An economic downturn in Brazil in 2001,
caused by an energy crisis, fears of a debt default, and political squabbles,
mirrored a similar situation in Argentina. In the meantime, Chile suspended
talks on full membership in MERCOSUR and announced that it was entering
into free-trade negotiations with the United States.36
4. Paradise Lost: The Argentine Meltdown
Argentina's economic situation also took a turn for the worse. By
December 2001, forty-one months of a steadily shrinking economy had created
deflation, with prices across the economy falling, corporate profits dwindling,
Los Desaflos de MERCOSUR ante la Devaluaci6n de la Moneda Brasilia, UN ECLAC
(Santiago de Chile, Feb. 2001) [hereinafter O'Connell]; Heymann, infra note 422.
361 Breaking Point, supra note 17; Sour MERCOSUR, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
A commentator noted, however, that this crisis should actually strengthen MERCOSUR in the
long run because: (a) this crisis had happened before; (b) this crisis has made Argentina and
Brazil understand how important it is to coordinate macroeconomic policy and to strengthen and
create a formal liaison mechanism between them (with MERCOSUR being the perfect candidate
for such a mechanism) and (c) the way the crisis was handled shows that centuries of political
distrust and hostility have been substantially eroded. Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, supra note 17,
at 5A.
362 Breaking Point, supra note 17.
363 Id.
36 Neighbor-Bashing, supra note 20
36 INFtORME DEL GRUPO MERCADO COMON, supra note 21, at 2-4.
31 Chopping Block, supra note 17; Crossroads, supra note 17.
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and government revenues shrinking. A substantial amount of foreign debt and
a run on bank deposits further complicated the situation.367
This economic crisis and the substantial hardships it caused across the
board to Argentine businesses and consumers created massive political
turmoil, which included riots and demonstrations, the resignation of President
de la Rua in December 2001,368 the election and resignation of an interim
president, Adolfo Rodriguez Saa, in December,369 and the election of a third
president, Eduardo Duhalde, in February 2002.370
The Argentine government's reactions to this economic crisis were
extreme. In December 2001, substantial limits on bank withdrawals and
currency transfers out of the country were imposed.37' On December 23,2001,
the Argentine government declared default on its $132 billion debt to foreign
and domestic creditors.372 On January 13, 2002, Argentina abandoned its
currency board, which pegged the peso at parity with the dollar, causing a
substantial devaluation of the peso.373 Finally, on April 22, 2002, Argentina
shut its banks and foreign exchange markets. This political and economic
crisis continued into 2003. 374
The close economic relations among the MERCOSUR members became a
cause for concern. Commentators worried that "the Argentine meltdown,"
would extend to Brazil. 375 The economies of Uruguay and Paraguay also
seemed to be undergoing difficult conditions and there, too, the fear was that
367 David Luhnow & Pamela Druckerman, Last Tango: Long Hailed as Hero, Reformer in
Argentina Sees his Dream Sour, WALLST. J., Dec. 4, 2001, at A1 [hereinafter Last Tango]. See
Manuel Pastor & Carol Wise, From Poster Child to Basket Case, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec.
2001, at 60 (providing an excellent discussion and analysis of the causes for this economic
crisis).
368 Clifford Krauss, Argentine LeaderDeclares Default on Billions in Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
24, 2001, at AI [hereinafter Leader Declares Default].
369 Larry Rohter, Within Hours, 2 Quit as Argentine Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2001, at
A6.
370 A Decline without Parallel, ECONOMIST, Mar. 2, 2002, at 26.
37' Last Tango, supra note 367.
372 Leader Declares Default, supra note 368.
171 Jennifer L. Rich, Argentine Peso Sinks to New Lows as Crisis Continues, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
17, 2002, at Wl.
371 See Return to the Dark Ages, ECONOMIST, Apr. 27, 2002, at 35. Although the economic
situation has recently shown some improvements, it is still critical. See Larry Rohter, Argentina
Lifts Its Freeze on Most Bank Accounts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2002; Larry Rohter, Signs of Life
in Argentina, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2003; The IMF Climbs Aboard, ECONOMIST, Jan. 25, 2003;
Storm Abated, Outlook Still Unsettled, ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2003; Larry Rohter, Argentina
Looks to a New Leader, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2003, at 14.
311 See Clifford Krauss, Argentina's Malaise, Ever Worsening, Could Infect Others, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 2001, at C16; Spreading Risk, ECONOMIST, June 29, 2002, at 68.
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their economies would collapse as a result of their close relationship with
Brazil and Argentina, the two largest economies in the region.376
Recent interactions between Brazil and Argentina in the context of the
latter's devaluation of the peso indicate, however, that both countries are trying
very hard to restore amicable and cooperative relations with each other and in
the context of MERCOSUR. The president of Brazil's central bank called the
Argentine devaluation "a necessary first step toward revitalizing
MERCOSUR" and held open the possibility of an eventual common currency
among MERCOSUR members.377 The MERCOSUR presidents in July 2002
reaffirmed their commitment to "the achievement of the objectives of The
Treaty of Asunci6n" despite the member states' current economic
difficulties a.37 The severe economic downturn in the region still continues,
however, and has had a highly detrimental impact on regional trade.379 In spite
of these continuing difficulties, the new presidents of Argentina and Brazil,
meeting in Brasilia on June 11, 2003, again reaffirmed their commitment to the
revitalization and expansion of MERCOSUR and, as part of this process,
pledged to create a MERCOSUR parliament and ajoint monetary institute that
would begin the process of achieving a common currency.380 They also
pledged to not sign any individual free-trade area agreements with the United
States and to participate as a group in the forthcoming FTAA negotiations.3"'
376 See A region prays it will not slide down Argentina's slope, ECONOMIST, June 29, 2002,
at 34; Semi.-divorced - Uruguay's battle not to be Argentina, ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 2002, at 33;
Argentina's woes have left a small neighbour reeling, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2002; Don't watch
my lips-UruguayandArgentina, ECONOMIST, June 8,2002; Larry Rohter, Uruguay Lifts Limits
on Peso to Assist Economy, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2002, at W1.
... Louis Uchitelle, Argentina's Woes may Strengthen its Ties to Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10,
2002, at C1.
378 Comunicado July 2002, supra note 313, at para. 3.
379 See Larry Rohter, Argentina in Scramble to Bolster Peso, Again, N.Y. TIMES, July 10,
2002, at WI.
380 Kevin Hall, Argentina, Brazil put U.S. Bid for Trade Zone on Back Burner, PHILA.
INQUIRER, June 12, 2003, at A24 [hereinafter Back Burner]; Terry Wade, Latin Trade Bloc
Flexes its Muscle, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2003, at A13 [hereinafter Trade Block]; Eleonora
Gosman, Kirchner y Lula se Juraron Fidelidad para Negociar Juntos ante el ALCA, CLARIN
(Buenos Aires, Argentina), June 12, 2003, available at http:/lold.clarin.com/diario/2003/06/12/
p-00601.htm [hereinafter Fidelidad]; Lula y Kirchner Pretenden Ampliar el Bloque, EL PAIS
(Montevideo, Uruguay), June 11, 2003, available at http:llwww.diarioelpais.com/03/06/1 1/
ultimo_44810.asp [hereinafter Bloque]; Kirchner y Lula lamaron a 'la Integraci6n Regional',
CLAPIN (Buenos Aires, Argentina), June 11, 2003, available at http://impresion.clarin.coml
imprimir.jsp?pagid=573133 [hereinafter Integraci6n].
a8' Back Burner, supra note 380; Trade Block, supra note 380; Fidelidad, supra note 380;
Bloque, supra note 380; Integraci6n, supra note 380.
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C. Success, Difficulties and the Future
1. The EU and MERCOSUR: Is it a Match?
The initial reaction that strikes an observer of the EU-MERCOSUR
relationship is the magnitude of the undertaking that the parties have agreed
to and the speed at which it has begun to develop. It aims at nothing less than
the elimination of all barriers (tariff and non-tariff) and the establishment of
free trade in all goods and services, as well as strengthened political dialogue
between the EU, MERCOSUR and its associate members,382 whose territory
contains a population of 210 million and includes two of the largest and richest
countries in Latin America. Should this goal be achieved, the EU and
MERCOSUR would constitute the largest trading block in the world.383
The parties clearly seem to be quite serious about completing this
undertaking successfully. Dozens of experts have exchanged reams of
documents and have met and negotiated extensively. They have even gotten
to the point of being able to agree on some joint texts and are clearly now
exchanging written proposals.384 The stakes are enormous. Trade between
MERCOSUR and the EU and Chile exceeded 49 billion Euros in 1998.
Indeed, the EU is MERCOSUR and Chile's main trading partner after the
United States and Japan.385 The EU also projected that, by the beginning of the
twenty-first century, EU investments in the MERCOSUR countries and Chile
would total $83 billion and would encompass about fifty percent of the total
foreign investment in the region.386 Financially, the MERCOSUR trade
relationship is clearly very important to the EU.
For MERCOSUR, a free trade area relationship with the EU would grant
its products preferential access to one of the largest markets in the world. This
liberalized access would represent a massive benefit to the agricultural and
industrial export markets of the member states. Furthermore, the relationship
382 EU OVERVIEW 2001, supra note 261, at 4.
313 EUROPEAN UNION INTERESTS IN MERCOSUR AND CHIE, available at http://europa.eu.intl
comm/extemalrelations/mercosurbacground-doc/reporL_ nov99.htm (last visited Dec. 7,
2003). See Lisa Anderson, The Future of Hemsiphere Free Trade: Towards a Unified
Hemisphere?, 20 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 635. See also http://www.graphicmaps.com/webimage/
countrys/sa.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2003).
384 See supra notes 293-313 and accompanying text.
385 EU Interests, supra note 383, at 2. The biggest individual customer appears to be Brazil,
which received imports from the EU of 15 billion Euros in 1998 and is the EU's ninth largest
customer. Id.
386 Id. at 6-7.
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would provide a strong attraction and benefit for other Latin American nations
who may want to consider entry to or association with MERCOSUR.
Time, however, is of the essence, because the EU has a competitor, the
FTAA. The FTAA, which arose out of the 1994 Summit of the Americas in
Miami (Miami Summit)," 7 is meant to be a multilateral, comprehensive
regional economic integration treaty to be entered into among the thirty-four
nations that attended the Miami Summit.3"' Negotiations on a draft agreement
started in June 1998389 and are meant to be concluded no later than January
2005, with the treaty coming into effect no later than December 2005. 3"'
The negotiations process itself is rather extensive and comprehensive. The
negotiations are to be guided by a Trade Negotiations Committee, which will
manage the negotiation groups that will deal with specific subject matters. 39'
Nine different negotiating groups will engage in actual detailed negotiations:
market access; investment; services; government procurement; dispute
settlement; agriculture; intellectual property rights; subsidies, antidumping and
countervailing duties, and competition policy.392 The negotiating groups
operate subject to general guidelines and specific instructions from the trade
ministers.3 93 A second draft agreement was produced by the Trade Negotia-
tions Committee in November 2002 and negotiations continue.
"' Summit of the Americas, Plan of Action, Section 11 (9), available at http://www.sice.oas.
orglFTAA/miami/sapoae.asp. (last visited Dec. 7,2003) [hereinafter Plan of Action]. The FTAA
is only one of a number of initiatives arising out of this summit. Other initiatives include, inter
alia, strengthening democracy, promoting and protecting human rights, promoting cultural
values, combating corruption, eradicating poverty and discrimination, and guaranteeing
sustainable development and conserving the natural environment. Id.
"' Id.; San Josd Declaration, supra note 23, para. 1-2.
389 Second Plan of Action, supra note 24, para. III.A.I.1.
" Buenos Aires Declaration, supra note 25, para. 2. This deadline was last reiterated in
Quito, Ecuador, in November 2002. Free Trade Area of the Americas, Seventh Meeting of
Ministers of Trade of the Hemisphere, Quito, Ecuador (Nov. 1, 2001), available at http://www.
alca-ftaa.org.ministerials/quito/ministe.asp, para. 1 [hereinafter Quito Declaration].
"' San Jos6 Declaration, supra note 23, para. 10.
392 Id. para. 12.
..3 See, e.g., FTAA-Trade Negotiations Committee, Methods and Modalities for Negotiations
(Oct. 18, 2002) (FTrAA.TNC/20/Rev. 1), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/FTAA/M&M-e.
asp.; FTAA-Trade Negotiations Committee, Guidelines or Directives for the Treatment of the
Differences in the levels of Development and Size of Economies, available at http://www.sice.
oas.org/FrAA/pautas-e.asp (last visited Dec. 7,2003) [hereinafter Different Level Guidelines];
Quito Declaration, supra note 390, at Annex 1; Buenos Aires Declaration, supra note 25, at
Annex 1.
' FTAA-Free Trade Area of the Americas, Second Draft Agreement (Nov. 1, 2002)
FTAA.TNC/w/133/Rev.2, available at http://www.alca-ftaa.org/ftaadraft02/eng/draft-e.asp.
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The process described above seems to have some similarities with the
ALADI tariff negotiations process, which required extensive negotiations
among a large number of parties with different trade relationships and
economic systems. 39 5 Indeed, many observers seem to doubt that negotiations
will be completed by the deadline.396 The United States seems to be primarily
focusing on stronger protections for intellectual property, free trade in services,
and access to foreign government contracts 397 while other parties, like Brazil,
seem to be chiefly interested in the United States ending agricultural subsidies
and stopping antidumping measures. 39' Agreement on these issues may be
very difficult. As was the case with ALADI, the easy issues seem to have been
agreed upon quickly, and the remaining issues may prove exceedingly difficult,
time-consuming, and perhaps impossible to master.399 Furthermore, provisions
in the draft agreement have been criticized, both in the United States and Latin
America,' and these criticisms may influence the finalization, ratification, or
implementation of the FTAA. If the FTAA is not in place by 2005, then the
EU and MERCOSUR will have a strong incentive to complete their negotia-
tions and create their own free-trade area.
On the other hand, if the FTAA agreement has been negotiated and agreed
upon by 2005, MERCOSUR has to consider its position within the context of
an FTAA-United States dominated trade environment. MERCOSUR might
wish to consider itself becoming a party to the FTAA agreement, or somehow
co-existing with the FTAA organization." The incentive for MERCOSUR to
'91 See Treaty Establishing a Free Trade Area and Instituting the Latin American Free Trade
Association (Feb. 18, 1960) 1484 U.N.T.S. 223, arts. 2-7, 14, 16-17, 23-24,27; F. JoHNMATHIS,
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA: THE PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS OF LAFTA 17-18
(1969); JUAN MARIE VACCHINO, INEGRACI1N LATINO AMERICANA: DE LA ALALC A LA A CADI
78, 86 (1983).
396 Trade Wind: Talking up the FTAA and Mercosur, ECONOMIST, June 28, 2003, at 34
[hereinafter Trade Wind].
... See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. Advances Bold
Proposals in FTAA Negotiations to Create World's Largest Free Market in 2005 (Feb. I 1, 2003),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2003/02/03-08.htm.
398 Id.
I" This does not mean that they cannot be overcome. One suggestion by Brazil appears to
have been to move all sensitive topics off the FTAA negotiations and into more generalized
WTO negotiations. This would result in a narrower agreement which can be more easily
completed. The United States has apparently not been very receptive to this suggestion. Id.
'o See, e.g., Karen Hansen-Kuhn, Latin Americans against the FTAA-Another Americas is
Possible, Alliance for Responsible Trade (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.art-us.org., Karen
Hansen-Kuhn, Free Trade Area of the Americas, vol. 6 no. 12 (Apr. 2001), available at http:/f
www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol6/v6nl2ftaa-body.html.
"' The FTAA negotiators have indicated that the FTAA can co-exist with other existing
[Vol. 32:1
MERCOSUR
join an EU-dominated free-trade area in that environment would probably
diminish substantially.
Concluding the Framework Agreement negotiations will not be easy. First,
the Framework Agreement has created a complicated, bureaucratic and
essentially consensus-driven process for the negotiations themselves. This
process requires the Technical Groups and Subgroups to negotiate on their
areas of interest and then report their recommendations to the BNC, which
must approve them and apparently refer them to the Cooperation Council,
which must in turn approve them. At the same time, the BNC is itself engaged
in negotiations covering other topics. All Cooperation Council recommenda-
tions must then be submitted to the EU and MERCOSUR councils for
approval. 4°2 The problem with this process is that, while it ensures that the
final product will clearly be the product of a consensus of the parties, it is
extremely time-consuming and dependent on such a consensus. If a consensus
is not forthcoming on all or some of the major issues under discussion, the
negotiations may break down or be delayed extensively.
Another obstacle to consider is the fact that, until now, the negotiations
have been moving steadily apace without interruptions because the difficult
issues (such as tariff barriers, especially tariff barriers for agricultural
products) have not yet been considered. As the EU itself has noted,
MERCOSUR has not been able to agree by itself (or with Chile) on a
liberalization regime for certain industrial sectors. 3 Since a substantial
portion of the exports from MERCOSUR to the EU involve agricultural
products, a major area of contention is likely to be the easing of restrictions on
agricultural and food exports from MERCOSUR. 4'° MERCOSUR is likely to
push for substantial liberalization, and the EU (with its highly complicated and
contentious Common Agricultural Policy and agricultural sectors 5) is more
regional integration agreements. It may, however, need to modify its agreements in order to do
so. Summit of the Americas, Third Trade Ministerial Meeting, Belo Horizonte, Brazil (May 16,
1997), at par. 5(a)2, available at http://www.alca-ftaa.org/ministerials/belo-e.asp.
4'2 See supra notes 290-92 and accompanying text. The EU appears to have obtained
something akin to Congressional fast-track authority in the United States, which may enable it
to speedily obtain approval of the final text. Under the MERCOSUR system, once the Council
approves such an agreement, it must be ratified by the member states. See RL&P, supra note
128, at 16-19.
" Overview (July 2000 Situation) § 1.5 (copy on file with author) [hereinafter 2000
Overview].
'o Negotiating Market Access, supra note 11, at 4.
"05 Common Agricultural Policy, available at http://europaeu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/ind/en-
analytical-index_03.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2003). See also Derek W. Uruin, CommuNrrYoF
EUROPE 132-35 (1991).
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likely to resist such an initiative.' This situation may already be manifesting
itself. After the EU presentation of its tariff proposal (which included
agricultural products), the MERCOSUR reaction was merely to thank the EU
side for their proposal and indicate that a counterproposal would be forthcom-
ing. Furthermore, the Common Agricultural Policy is currently the subject of
reform as part of the EU's "Agenda 2000." This process of reform, which is
also tied to the EU's enlargement, is highly sensitive and could be
contentious.° 7 Until the EU has reformed the Common Agricultural Policy,
it is unlikely that a final agreement on agricultural matters will be reached""~
Lastly, two cultural issues may interfere with the negotiations themselves.
The first is that of organizational culture. Clearly, there is a view among at
least some quarters in the EU that it is a more "modem," "advanced," better
organized, and more developed international organization than MERCOSUR,
which is more of a less-developed "junior partner" which requires mentoring
and assistance." 9 Although there is some truth to this perception,4 0 the
temptation to overreach, or to attempt to "dictate terms" to the other party may
be very strong and hard to resist. Following that impulse could be disastrous,
however. Furthermore, the EU is presently in the throes of a very difficult
process dealing with its own expansion."" This expansion will in all
Q6 See, e.g., Brussels Report: Latin Anger at Slow EUAgenda, THE GROCER, Apr. 22,2000,
available at LEXIS, ALLNEWSPLUS Database; Distant Friends-The EU and Latin America,
ECONOMIST, May 18, 2002, at 36 [hereinafter Distant Friends].
o Negotiating Market Access, supra note 11, at 11.
40' Id. at 3.
' 2000 Overview, supra note 403. This document, referring to MERCOSUR's lack of
"autonomous" (supranational) central institutions, describes it as "inspired by the example of the
EU, but which did not copy the EU model." Id. at para. 1.2. It also goes on to note that
[a]t present, MERCOSUR is still in the transition phase towards its common
market, comparable to where the EU was during the 1960s. It is an imperfect
common market, but one that is moving forwards as part of a process of
regional economic integration.... Common commercial policies are being
developed.., however, their adoption or application is sometimes delayed.
Id. para. 1.5. The tone of the description of the MERCOSUR integration process in this
document is somewhat negative and patronizing. See id. para. 1.1-1.7. Interestingly enough,
this language has been deleted from the current Overview on the EU's website, and substituted
with much different language. Compare EU OVERVIEW 2001, supra note 261, at 2,4. The 2000
Overview has been removed from the EU website.
410 COFFEY, supra note 33, at 12; Marta Haines-Ferrari, MERCOSUR: A New Model of Latin
American Economic Integration, 25 CASE W. Res. J. INT'LL. 413, 427-28 (1993). See supra
notes 290-92 and accompanying text.
4 Agenda 2000: For a stronger and wider Europe, COM (97) 2000 final and The Challenge




likelihood include the admission to the EU of a number of countries with
vastly different economic and political situations and characteristics from those
of the current EU members. The expansion has also been the subject of a
substantial amount of controversy."" Some of the issues in (or solutions to)
the controversies engendered by the expansion of the EU may have unintended
consequences that spill over into the MERCOSUR negotiations and make the
negotiations more complicated and difficult.
2. Economic Disaster
MERCOSUR has generated many great achievements since 1990, more
than any other economic integration organization in Latin America. It has
formalized and expanded cooperation and trading relationships among Brazil,
Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, and has developed these relationships into
a viable and vibrant economic integration organization. For a substantial
period of time, its members enjoyed unprecedented expanded trade and greater
prosperity. As discussed in the Introduction, it has agreed on a common
external tariff covering eighty-five percent of the items currently being traded
by its members4 3 and has reached agreement on a substantial number of trade
matters. It has adopted many measures to eliminate barriers to free trade and
to harmonize the legal and regulatory systems of the member states.4 4 It has
convinced the elites of its member states that the idea of economic integration
is both feasible and desirable. 5 It has an agenda for the future and is working
towards its implementation.416 It has created an awareness in the private
sectors of the member states of new regional export markets and has stimulated
new investments and diversification.41 7 Indeed, proof of this progress is an
agreement to liberalize trade in the automotive sector entered into between
MERCOSUR and Mexico in July 2002.418 At that time, commentators in the
member states were talking about more integration, macroeconomic policy
412 id.
413 Negotiating Market Access, supra note 11, at 5.
44 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
415 See Elites, supra note 343 and accompanying text.
416 Buenos Aires, supra note 15; Montevideo, supra note 15; Florian6polis, supra note 15.
4 7 Robert Devlin, THE FREE TRADE AREA OFTHE AMERICAS AND MERCOSUR-EUROPEAN
UNION FREE TRADE PROCESSES: CAN THEY LEARN SOMETHING FROM EACH OTHER?, Occasional
Paper 6 INTALJITD (2000), available at http://www.iadb.org/intal/publicaciones/devlin-op6.
pdf.
"" Tony Smith, Mexico and Brazil Sign Bilateral Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2002, at
W1.
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harmonization, and even a single currency.4" 9 The future looked very bright
indeed.
This bright future seems to have been obscured since 1999, when major
economic difficulties created substantial distress, first in Brazil, then in
Argentina, and lastly in Paraguay and Uruguay.420 Argentina and Brazil found
themselves unable to agree on further norms and seeking (or talking about
seeking) to repeal or ignore norms previously agreed to.421
Clearly, the dramatic economic distress that the MERCOSUR member
states are currently undergoing is distracting them from the MERCOSUR
agenda.422 In their current situation, the natural instinct is to fully dedicate
their resources, efforts, and energy to resolving their domestic economic
problems first, and to consider the regional trade liberalization and economic
integration agenda later. This will clearly be the case where the choice might
be between a protectionist measure that might yield short-term domestic
benefits and a liberalization measure that might actually provoke a short-term
negative economic effect in the member states. Given the current configura-
tion of MERCOSUR, until its member states resolve their economic difficul-
ties, there is little likelihood of any substantial further progress on the
implementation and expansion of the MERCOSUR agenda.
3. "Relaunching" MERCOSUR
In December 1999, the presidents of the MERCOSUR member states
reiterated that the prompt incorporation of MERCOSUR norms into the
national systems of the member states had extremely high priority and noted
that measures were needed to ensure this incorporation.423 Concern had been
expressed in the media that the economic problems and frictions that occurred
in 1998-1999 between Argentina and Brazil might substantially hamper the
progress of the MERCOSUR agenda.42 4 Shortly thereafter, in April 2000, the
Council and the member states agreed to "relaunch" MERCOSUR. This
relaunching featured an agreement by the economic ministers and central bank
presidents of the member states to harmonize their statistics and to engage in
419 See Florian6polis, supra note 15, at para. 7.
420 See supra notes 360-81 and accompanying text.
421 Id.
422 DANIELHEYMANN, REGIONALINTERDEPENDENCE AND MACROECONOMIC CRISES: NOTES
ON MERCOSUR, 132 (Buenos Aires, Nov. 2001).
"' Montevideo, supra note 15, para. 11.




macroeconomic coordination to establish "convergence criteria" on fiscal
policies, prices, and public debt.'25
Additional agreements included a market-access agreement, which forbids
member states from adopting any measures which restrict reciprocal trade. 26
This decision required all member states to supply a list by July 30, 2000, of
all measures of any type which limited market access and required the Group
to establish, by November 11, 2000, a plan of action to eliminate these
427restrictions.
The Council also instructed the Group to formulate, by November 30,2000,
a proposal to limit antidumping investigations and their application to
interzonal commerce. 2" The Group was also to instruct its committees and
technical groups to prepare a proposal to eliminate antidumping measures
within MERCOSUR and to establish a common regulation on antidumping by
non MERCOSUR member states. These proposals were to be submitted to the
Council no later than December 31, 2001.429
The Council also reaffirmed its commitment to joint negotiations for
commercial agreements granting tariff preferences which involve non-member
states, and barred member states from executing, after June 30, 2001, any new
tariff agreements that have not been negotiated by MIERCOSUR. 30
The Council also instructed the Group to present a proposal for the
"institutional strengthening" of the Administrative Secretariat. The language
of the decisions implied an expansion in its number of personnel and in its
425 Id. Buenos Aires, supra note 15, para. 5. Some have argued that these should be the first
steps to a common currency for MERCOSUR. See, e.g., Economist looks at Prospects for
Further MERCOSUR Integration, BBC Summary World Broadcast, Jan. 5, 1998, available at
LEXIS, ALLNEWSPLUS Database); Mario Osava, Trade-LATAM: Fiscal Discipline, New Key
to MERCOSUR Integration, Inter Press Serv., May 9, 2000, at LEXIS, ALLNEWSPLUS
Database [hereinafter Fiscal Discipline].
426 OAS/SICK, Decisiones del Consejo del Mercado Comin, MERCOSUR/CAC/Dec.22/00,
art. 1, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsrs/decisions/Dec2200s.asp (last visited
Dec. 7, 2003).
427 Id. arts. 2-3. See Proyectos de Decisi6n, MERCOSUR/GMC/Res. No. 38/02 (Acuerdo
del Plan General de Cooperacion y Coordinacion Reciproca para la Seguridad Regional entre
los Estados Partes del MERCOSUR, Bolivia y Chile), available at http://www.mercosur.org.
uy/espanollsnor/normativalresoluciones/2002/0238.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2003) [hereinafter
Proyectos].
428 MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC No. 28/2000, art. 1, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/
mrcsrs/decisions/Dec2800s.asp (last visited Dec. 7, 2003).
429 Id. arts. 2-3. See Proyectos, supra note 427 (Acuerdo Antidumping de la Organizacion
Mundial de Comercio).
430 MERCOSUR/CMCIDec. No. 32/00, arts. 1-3, available athttp://www.sice.oas.orgltradel
mrcsrs/decisions/dec3200s.asp (last visited Dec. 7, 2003).
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budget and required this proposal to be presented to the Council before
December 10, 2000."3' The latest proposals for the year 2002 include a budget
of $980,000432 and a staff of twenty-seven.
The Council, at its Florian6polis meeting in December 2000, recognized
that the current MERCOSUR dispute resolution mechanism is inadequate and
established a group of senior officials that are to propose "improvements" to
the system, which would consider the establishment of a MERCOSUR arbitral
tribunal. 33 These improvements are set forth in Olivos.434 In the same
communiqu6, the MERCOSUR presidents hailed the agreement, after nine
years, on a common policy on the automotive sector;435 identified a policy
agreement on the sugar industry as a high priority; and reiterated the impor-
tance of macroeconomic coordination.436 The process of macroeconomic
coordination has gone very slowly. As of July 2002, the MERCOSUR
presidents were reiterating the importance of macroeconomic coordination and
agreeing again to undertake and continue the process.437
These are welcome developments. They clearly show that substantial areas
of the MERCOSUR agreements and agenda need to be incorporated and
implemented into the domestic legal and economic systems of the member
states. They also show that even one of the most intractable tariff problems
facing MERCOSUR, that of the automotive sector, can eventually be resolved,
and show some level of commitment by the organization and its members to
a continuation of the integration process. By imposing short deadlines for
continued progress, they seek to energize it. They also have recognized the
absolute need for an effective Administrative Secretariat and dispute
resolutions systems and have undertaken a commitment to strengthen and
expand the former and create the latter.
These developments illustrate, however, obstacles to the MERCOSUR
integration process. There seems to be a substantial gap between the
agreement on policy at the MERCOSUR level and the implementation of this
policy at the member-state level. Neither the Administrative Secretariat nor
"' MERCOSUR/CMC/Dec. No.24/00, arts. 1-2, available at http://www.sice.oas.orgltradel
mrcsrs/decisions/dec2400s.asp (last visited Dec. 7, 2003).
432 Res 01/02, supra note 148. Res 15/02, supra note 147, art. 01.
433 Florian6polis, supra note 15.
434 See Olivos, supra note 100 and accompanying text.
435 Florian6polis, supra note 15, para. 11.
436 Florian6polis, supra note 15, para. 12.
431 Communicado Conjunto de los Presidentes de los Estados Parles del Mercosur, July 5,




any other MERCOSUR institution has the resources to effectively supervise,
on a current basis, the negotiation of new norms, the implementation of
established norms, and the negotiations to expand the organization. The
member states may be too preoccupied with their domestic concerns,
perspectives, and priorities to be able to do any of it.
Relaunching MERCOSUR, in the sense of expediting the integration
process and making it more effective and efficient, will require a paradigm
change. Given all the progress that has been made, the future agenda and its
implementation have become far too extensive and complex for
MERCOSUR's current framework. The supranational integration process, by
now very successful, needs to be managed by a supranational actor with
adequate resources and authority. The supranational norms created by this
process need a mechanism to ensure that they are implemented by the member
states in an expeditious and uniform fashion. Some sort of effective enforce-
ment mechanism needs to be created to ensure that norms are followed and
those who fail to do so are sanctioned.
4. The Lack of a Supranational Entity
As seen above, MERCOSUR's institutions, with the exception of a very
small Administrative Secretariat, are all member-state based. The members of
the various institutions and their staffs are representatives of the governments
of the member states and are subject to their government's authority and
direction.438 The member states have not delegated a substantial amount of
power to the organization's institutions. Furthermore, no institution
439 See supra notes 111-53 and accompanying text. There are currently twenty-seven
members of the Secretariat staff. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text. For an
illuminating discussion of the tension between the supranational institutions of the EU and the
interests of its member states, see Barbara Crutchfield George et al., The Dilemma of the
European Union: Balancing the Power of the Supranational EU Entity Against the Sovereignty
of its Independent Member Nations, 9 PACE INT'L L. REV. 111 (1997) [hereinafter Dilemma].
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equivalent to the EU commission or its extensive bureaucracy4 39 is in charge
of identifying, implementing or enforcing the MERCOSUR norms and agenda.
Two effects spring from this situation. First, the absence of a supranational
"guardian of the agenda" makes the progress of the integration process uneven.
When times are good and member state enthusiasm for integration and trade
liberalization is high, the organization's work will move expeditiously. When
times are bad and the member states' attentions are focused elsewhere, the
institutions will not function as well."' Second, the EU Commission, in its
"guardian of the treaties function," serves an important function in enforcing
member state compliance with the EU's norms. The Commission has the right
to investigate and commence proceedings before the ECJ against any member
state which has violated the Treaty of Rome."' The fact that the institution
which has substantial powers to implement and enforce EU law is an
"objective," supranational entity"' unconnected to any particular member state
gives its actions great credibility. Without a similar institution (and, as shall
be seen below, without a truly effective system of dispute resolution and norm
enforcement), enforcement of MERCOSUR norms will be very difficult.
Without effective enforcement of these norms, they will become meaningless
and the organization will become powerless." 3
439 The European Commission consists of 20 members, appointed by agreement
between the member governments. There are two nationals each from France,
Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK and one from each of he other ten member
states. Throughout their four-year term of office members must remain
independent of the government and of the Council ... In broad terms the
Commission's role is to act as the guardian of the Treaties, to serve as the
executive arm of the committees, to initiate Community policy, and to defend
the Community interest in the Council.
JAMES D. DINNAGE & JOHN F. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
22 (1996). The term Commission is also used to mean the 13,000 members of the staff. ORIGINS
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 198 (David Wigall and Peter Stirk, eds.,
1992).
440 In the EU, the Commission, with its long-term planning and persistence, is credited with
"keeping the flame of European integration alive" and promoting the expansion of the
organization through times of economic trouble and low member state interest. DEREK W.
URWIN, THE COMMUNITY OFEUROPE 81 (A.J. Nicholls & Martin S. Alexander, eds., 1991). See
also Jenna Bednar et al., The Politics of European Federalism, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 279
(1996).
44 Treaty of Rome, supra note 128, arts. 169-70.
442 Members of the EU Commission are chosen chiefly for their dedication to the integration
agenda and are not permitted to take instruction from their home states. JAMES D. DINNAGE &
JOHN F. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, DOCUMENTARY
SUPPLEMENT 94 (1996).
"3 See Dilemma, supra note 438, at 117, 128; Felipe A.M. de ]a Balze, Finding Allies in the
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5. The Lack of an Effective Dispute Resolution System
MERCOSUR has quite successfully begun the process of reversing decades
of mistrust and hostility among its member states and has been able to enact
a number of trade liberalization norms." In order to be effective, these norms
must be interpreted in a consistent manner and must be effectively enforced.
Unfortunately, MERCOSUR simply does not have an effective dispute-
resolution mechanism. It has no institution equivalent to the ECJ that will
interpret and explain a growing body of community law and norms. A panel
of permanently appointed, objective, professional judges, sitting in open court
in transparent proceedings, ensures a consistent interpretation of the institu-
tion's legal norms that will be perceived as fair. This perception ensures that
its rulings will be followed by all participants.445
The MERCOSUR ad hoc arbitration dispute resolution procedure, even as
strengthened by Olivos,"' is simply not adequate. It was designed for two or
more member states to submit a dispute arising out of the MERCOSUR norms
to an ad hoc panel of administrators appointed for that particular case. These
arbitrators, selected from a list compiled and kept by MERCOSUR, may not
necessarily be objective." 7 They serve for the individual case and are not
guaranteed to be reappointed to another case." 8 The Tribunal functions as
another arbitration panel, with the difference that the same members will
always hear all appeals. Although the arbitration awards entered into pursuant
to this system are published, the process itself is private among the parties
only, with no participation by amici curiae."9 The process is not transparent.
The mechanism for enforcing decisions is extremely weak. The mechanism
itself has been used only a limited number of times since its creation. 5° This
is simply not the equivalent of a professional, permanent judiciary that, by
Back Yard: NAFTA and the Southern Cone, 80 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 7, 10 (2001) [hereinafter
Finding Allies].
'4 As has been seen above, some of these norms are more aspirational than others, and others
require substantial implementation by the member states before they can achieve their purposes.
See, e.g., Colonia Protocol for the Reciprocal Promotion of Investments MERCOSUR/CMC/Dec
No. 11/93, available at http://www.mercosur.org.uy/espanol/snor/normativa/decisiones/
DECI 193.htm [hereinafter Colonial; Non Member States Protocol, supra note 219.
"5 See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
'Olivos, supra note 100.
"7 See Olivos, supra note 100 and accompanying text.
448 The majority of arbitrators who have served are taken from the list of arbitrators, but only
three arbitrators have served more than once. See Arbitros, supra note 187.
"4 See Olivos, supra note 100 and accompanying text.
450 Laudos, supra note 191.
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virtue of hearing cases repeatedly, develops a consistent body of law.
Moreover, this system is also not designed to be a mechanism which the
organization itself can use to enforce compliance with the norms it enacts. The
process of enforcing decisions also leaves much to be desired.
The absence of an effective and trustworthy dispute-resolution and norm-
enforcement mechanism creates major obstacles to the implementation and
expansion of the MERCOSUR agenda. First, member states who generally
abide by the rules and who are aggrieved by another member state's abuse or
noncompliance with a MERCOSUR rule or norm will naturally conclude that
they have no effective mechanism with which to protect their interests within
the organization. They "lose" more than they gain by participating in
MERCOSUR and abiding by its rules,45' whereas there is no effective penalty
for noncompliance with community norms. The implication from both
Trachtman and others452 is clear: an international economic organization that
cannot effectively enforce compliance with its norms and resolve disputes
arising out of its operations will not be effective.
6. To Infinity and Beyond?
Since the beginning of MERCOSUR's existence, a number of countries
have expressed an interest in joining MERCOSUR and have commenced
negotiations toward that end.453 Two countries in particular, Bolivia and Chile,
completed negotiations and joined MERCOSUR as associate members.454
Bolivia, Chile, and the EU do not seem to be the only candidates for
inclusion in some sort of free-trade area with MERCOSUR. In 1997, after
announcing its withdrawal from the Andean Group, Peri asserted that it
wished to open talks with MERCOSUR with the intention of joining Bolivia
and Chile as associate members. An Economic Complementation Agreement
was signed between Perid and MERCOSUR in late August 2003."'s
Since 1998, MERCOSUR has either commenced negotiations or entered
into agreements seeking to establish free-trade areas (or heightened trade
" This can be especially true for Paraguay and Uruguay, MERCOSUR's smaller members,
who have often felt that Brazil and Argentina dominate the organization to their disadvantage.
452 See Dilemma, supra note 438; Finding Allies, supra note 443.
" See infra notes 458-72 and accompanying text.
4 See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
455 Geoff Dyer, Peruvians Seek Mercosur Talks, FIN. TIMEs, May 16, 1997, at 7; Acuerdo de
Alcance Parcial de Complementaci6n Econ6mica MERCOSUR-Per (Aug. 25, 2003), available
at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/MRCSRPER/ACE.asp [hereinafter Perd Agreement].
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relations) with the Andean Community,456 Mexico,"5 7 the European Free Trade
Association," 8 South Africa 459 and India.'
These efforts follow a similar pattern in the form of a continuum. In the
case of Peril, the agreement establishes a free-trade area between Perd and
MERCOSUR, subject to the limitations and dispositions set forth therein. 6'
In the cases of the Andean Group, the objective of the agreement is to establish
a free-trade area between MERCOSUR and the Andean Group and promote
the development of integration among the members of the two organizations. 462
This free-trade area agreement is to come into effect on December 31,2003.463
The achievement of this agreement, then, appears to be a high priority one.
The case of South Africa seems to have a lesser priority; the goal is to promote
the development of commercial interchanges and establish the conditions for
456 Acuerdo Marco para la Creaci6n de la Zona de Libre Comercio entre la Comunidad
Andina y el MERCOSUR (Apr. 16, 1998), available at http:/www.sice.oas.org/tradelmrcsrl
meancoFs.asp [hereinafter Andean Pact Framework Agreement]. Acuerdo de
Complementaci6mica celebrado entre la Comunidad Andina y el Mercado Comgn del Sur
(MERCOSUR) (Dec. 6,2002), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/MRCSR/acMerAns.
asp [hereinafter Andean Pact Agreement].
" MERCOSUR/CMCIDEC No. 37/00 (June 29,2000), available at http://www.sice.oas.orgl
trade/mrcsrs/decisions/dec3700s.asp [hereinafter Mexican Negotiations]. An economic
complementation agreement for trade in automotive products was signed in August 2002.
Acuerdo de Complementaci6n Econ6mica No. 55 celebrado entre el MERCOSUR y los Estados
Unidos Mexicanos (Sept. 27, 2002), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/MERCOSUR
MexACE55/MERMexAutos.asp [hereinafter Mexican Auto Agreement]. A general framework
agreement was signed in July 2002. Acuerdo de Complementaci6n Econ6mica No. 54 celebrado
entre los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y los Estados Partes del Mercado Comtin del Sur
(MERCOSUR) (July 5, 2002), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/MERCOSUR
MexACE54/MERMex-s.asp [hereinafter Mexican Agreement].
458 MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC No.63/00 (Dec. 14,2000), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/
trade/mrcsrs/decisions/dec6200s.asp [hereinafter EFTA Declaration].
459 MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC 62/00 (Dec. 14, 2000), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/
trade/mrcsrs/decisions/dec6200.asp. [hereinafter South African Accord]. These negotiations
continue. See Communicado July 2002, supra note 313, at 521.
, Acuerdo Marco entre el MERCOSUR y la Repdiblica de la India (June 17, 2003),
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/MRCSR/Mercosur-India/Merlndia-s.asp [hereinafter
India Agreement].
"I Peru Agreement, supra note 455, arts. 3-11. The Perti Agreement greatly resembles the
Chile and Bolivia Agreements, but does not have the specific timetables for implementation of
the free-trade area that they do. See supra notes 202-226 and accompanying text.
462 Andean Pact Agreement, supra note 456, art. 1.
63 Id. art. 2(c). Clearly, this has not yet happened. Andean Pact Agreement, supra note 456,
at section 3(a). The Andean Community has also signed separate partial scope agreements with
Argentina on Aug. 1, 2000, and with Brazil on Aug. 16, 2000.
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the creation of a free-trade area between the parties, with no target date set.464
The process with Mexico is not as advanced; all the Mexico Agreement has
done is to recognize the Automotive Agreement and the previous agreements
signed between Mexico and the individual member states and to authorize the
initiation of negotiations with Mexico leading towards the execution of a free-
trade agreement.465
The EFTA Declaration is even less specific from the point of view of
results. Its objective is to increase economic relations, investment, and
cooperation between the EFTA countries and MERCOSUR through negotia-
tions.4 66 It is accompanied by a vague "Plan of Action" that describes some of
the substantive areas that the parties agree to discuss, again with no target
dates.4 67 The India agreement seeks an even more limited goal: to put in place
a fixed-preference agreement of limited scope directed to increase the bilateral
flow of trade between India and the MERCOSUR countries.468
Each of these agreements designates a "negotiating committee" composed
of representatives of both parties which will conclude the required negotiations
to achieve or implement the stated goal.469
This flurry of additional expansion activity on the part of MERCOSUR is,
in balance, problematic. On the one hand, if all of these plans were imple-
mented and came to fruition, MERCOSUR would form part of a free-trade
area covering a vast portion of the South American and European continents.
Free access to this enormous and highly sophisticated source of capital for its
raw materials and manufactured products would be highly advantageous. A
close relationship with the EU, a large, highly sophisticated common market
organization with substantial experience in integration, could also assist
MERCOSUR in its own internal development.
There are, however, problems. As noted above, MERCOSUR has not yet
been able to complete the integration process among its own members and
associate members.47 Extending the integration process before a template
"integration model" has been developed and proven successful (as was done
South African Accord, supra note 459, art. 2.
5 Mexican Agreement, supra note 457, art. 1.
4 EFTA Declaration, supra note 458, art. 1.
46 Id. at Annex. For example, the "Plan of Action" covers "the interchange of information
and technical cooperation in certain essential sectors" and the "identification and analysis of
measures, including those related to third countries, that influence commerce and investments."
Id. arts. 2(a), 2(b).
'B India Agreement, supra note 460, art. 4.
469 Andean Pact Agreement, supra note 456, art. 5; EFTA Declaration, supra note 458, art.
3; South African Accord, supra note 459, arts. 4-5.
470 See Normativa, available at http://www.mercosur.org.uy.
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in the EU) to a number of other countries with whom MERCOSUR does not
have current extensive trade relations is to invite a repeat of the LAFTA
disaster.47 Furthermore, engaging at the same time in a process of economic
and commercial integration with the EU, a highly integrated and extremely
complex economic and political system, can be even more challenging.
Moreover, there is a substantial logistical process involved in implementing
the process anticipated by these agreements. As seen by the example of the
EU, these negotiations cover a very large number of different technical areas,
economic sectors, and concepts, and generally involve the participation of
dozens of officials and other experts. Supervising the implementation of the
MERCOSUR common market and negotiating at least four different free-trade
(or economic harmonization) agreements at the same time presents a nearly
impossible task for MERCOSUR's small staff.472
There is another possible way to consider these agreements. The experi-
ence of the EU shows us that the process of integration is an extremely long-
term one. Perhaps these agreements and negotiations can be thought of as
creating a more symbolic, informal long-term relationship, rather than an
actual short-term formal relationship between MERCOSUR and other potential
partners. They are chiefly creating a link and a channel of communication.
They can be seen as statements of intent, meant to create, nurture, and
establish a generalized relationship and a tradition of cooperation among the
participants, rather than an actual free-trade area agreement within the short
term. In this case, the formal relationship can follow after MERCOSUR has
developed its own integration template for expansion and "EU-type negotia-
tions," involving dozens of actors need not follow in every case.473
The bottom-line question of whether MERCOSUR is "developed" and
"successful" enough to be able to expand its integration model and absorb
other economies and markets is, of course, extremely hard to answer. It is a
question with which the EU has been struggling for many years. Perhaps the
only way in which it can be answered is retrospectively; if MERCOSUR can
successfully negotiate free-trade agreements with other parties and if these
relationships are successful, then it was "developed and successful" enough to
expand.
471 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
472 The current Secretariat consists of twenty-seven persons. See supra notes 146-48 and
accompanying text.
411 The successful conclusion of a framework free-trade area agreement between the EU and
MERCOSUR can provide such a template.
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Apparently the increased trade, economic prosperity, and interdependence
which manifested itself in the member states throughout the early- and mid-
1990s excited other countries' interest in at least closer relations with
MERCOSUR. Furthermore, MERCOSUR's impressive track record in
drafting an agenda and in adopting norms to implement it gave a vastly
different impression to Latin American observers than LAFTA did; here was
an economic integration organization that got things done.474 Things were
going so well that suggestions about adopting a common currency like the
EU's were being seriously discussed."' The more prosperous and integrated
the economies of the member states became, the more potential members could
conclude that joining MERCOSUR could result in substantial economic gains.
This initial excitement does not appear to have translated itself into a
substantial number of new MERCOSUR members. There are, of course, many
individual economic and political reasons, on the part of both the organization
and the interested potential applicants, why these initial inquiries or negotia-
tions have not been successfully concluded. MERCOSUR also does not seem
to have a clear policy regarding expansion. Should there be limits on new
members? What should the nature of these limits be? Should there be any
new members at all?
The present ad hoc new membership policy did attract two new member
states to MERCOSUJR: Bolivia and Chile joined as associate members.476
They have not yet become full members. Indeed, it appears that Chile has
chosen not to consider full membership by discontinuing negotiations with
MERCOSUR. 477 This conclusion of negotiations is problematic. Since
Chile's entrance as an associate member, the organization has tried very hard
to integrate it. Both Chile and MERCOSUR have tried very hard to complete
full membership negotiations as promptly as possible.478 As discussed
previously, possible reasons for Chile's withdrawal include an unwillingness
to increase its already low tariff base to meet the MERCOSUR Common
External Tariff and a calculation that greater gains would be available from
474 As noted above, between 1990 and 2000, in accordance with its plan of action,
MERCOSUR adopted a Common External Tariff and 123 directives and resolutions. This level
of activity greatly exceeded LAFTA's and reflects impressive gains and movements in the
integration agenda. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.,.
" See supra note 359 and accompanying text.
476 See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
7 See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
, See supra notes 195, 238-46 and accompanying text.
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either a free-trade agreement with the United States or membership in a United
States-led free-trade zone, such as the FrAA. 9
MERCOSUR needs to examine its potential membership negotiations with
interested countries to determine whether any of its norms, negotiating styles,
or positions, or other factors, have negatively affected its ability to implement
free-trade area agreements or successfully conclude membership negotiations
with potential new members. As seen above, its lack of an effective suprana-
tional institution to keep its agenda "on track" can serve as a deterrent for new
members. An organization without a supranational "arbiter" among its
member states and their interests can find itself at the mercy of its largest and
most powerful members. Becoming thought of as an organization that is
dominated by its two largest members may not attract many potential new
members. Furthermore, MERCOSUR's lack of an effective, transparent, and
efficient dispute-resolution and norm-enforcement mechanism also acts as a
deterrent to potential new members.
Moreover, MERCOSUR needs to arrive at a concrete policy on expansion.
If it acquires members with little current trading contacts with its members, it
risks running into the same situation LAFTA ran into: members divided into
conflicting "interest" groups which might paralyze the organization com-
pletely. This was a major cause of LAFTA' s failure and is a situation to be
avoided.480
V. CONCLUSION
As has been seen above, MERCOSUR has generated many great achieve-
ments since 1990, more than any other economic integration organization in
Latin America. It has formalized and expanded cooperation and trading
relationships among its members and has developed these relationships into a
vibrant and viable economic integration organization. It has agreed upon the
gradual elimination of internal tariffs and on a common external tariff covering
approximately eighty-five percent of the items being traded by its members.
It has reached agreement on a substantial number of trade matters and has
adopted a large number of directives and resolutions seeking to harmonize the
legal and regulatory systems of the member states.4 ' Trade among its member
states expanded substantially and,4"2 for a substantial period of time, its
4 See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
41 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
'" See supra notes 413-17 and accompanying text.
482 See supra notes 337-40 and accompanying text.
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members enjoyed unprecedented expanded trade and prosperity. Unlike other
organizations, MERCOSUR is based on existing and successful trading
relations among its member states4 3 and has been strongly supported by their
business and political elites.484 These two factors have added to its success to
date.
There are some signs, however, that all is not well and that the
MERCOSUR integration process is not progressing and expanding. There are
signs that major economic difficulties that Brazil and Argentina have suffered
since 1999 have distracted them from the MERCOSUR agenda. As noted
earlier, given this current economic situation, their natural instinct is to fully
dedicate themselves to resolving their domestic economic problems first, and
to consider regional trade liberalization and economic integration agenda later.
This is especially true when the choice is between a domestic protectionist
measure that might bring short-term domestic benefits and a liberalization or
integration measure that might provoke a short-term negative domestic effect
in the member states. Negotiations for the accession of new members seem to
have stalled"' and one associate member, Chile, has abandoned full member
negotiations and sought instead a free trade agreement with the United
States.486 The member states, especially Argentina and Brazil, have found
themselves unable to agree on further norms, and have on occasion sought (or
talked about seeking) the repeal of specific norms or, worse, found themselves
ignoring previously agreed to norms. To make matters worse, MERCOSUR
finds itself facing a new competitor, the United States-sponsored Free Trade
Area of the Americas, which seeks to establish a hemisphere-wide free trade
area on its own terms.487
At this point, moving the MERCOSUR integration process forward by
implementing and expanding its agenda will be difficult. Given the current
configuration of MERCOSUR, until its member states resolve their economic
difficulties, there is little likelihood of any substantial further progress on the
implementation and expansion of its agenda. Moving past this point requires
a substantial paradigm change to resolve two problems: the lack of an effective
supranational entity and an effective and trustworthy dispute resolution and
norm enforcement mechanism within MERCOSUR.
483 id.
484 See supra notes 27-29 and 341-56 and accompanying text.
485 See supra notes 454-70 and accompanying text.
486 See supra notes 249-60 and accompanying text.
487 See supra notes 387-401 and accompanying text.
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Given all the progress that has been made, MERCOSUR's future agenda,
and its implementation, has become too extensive and complex for
MERCOSUR's current framework. The supranational integration process, by
now very successful, needs to be managed by a supranational actor with
adequate resources and authority. The supranational norms created by this
process need a mechanism to ensure that they are implemented by the member
states.
As has been seen above, MERCOSUR's institutions, with the exception of
a very small Administrative Secretariat, are all member-state based. Both the
members of the various institutions, and their staffs, are representatives of the
governments of the member states, and subject to their governments' authority
and direction.488 The member states have not delegated a substantial amount
of power to the organization's institutions. Two effects spring from this
situation. First, the absence of a supranational "guardian of the agenda" makes
the progress of the integration process uneven. When times are good and
member state enthusiasm for integration and trade liberalization is high, the
organization's work will move expeditiously. When economic times are bad
and the member states' attentions are focused elsewhere, the institutions will
not function as well. Second, a powerful supranational entity, in the style of
the EU Commission, serves an important function in enforcing member state
compliance with the organization's norms." 9 The fact that an institution
within the organization, with substantial powers to implement and enforce
community norms, is an "objective, supranational entity" unconnected to any
particular member states gives its actions great credibility. Without a similar
institutions, enforcement of MERCOSUR's norms will be very difficult.
Without effective enforcement of MERCOSUR's norms, they will become
meaningless and the organization will become powerless.
Furthermore, as noted above, the absence of an effective and trustworthy
dispute resolution and norm enforcement mechanisrp creates major obstacles
to the implementation and expansion of the MERCOSUR agenda."9 First,
member states who generally abide by the rules and who are aggrieved by
another member state's abuse or noncompliance with a MERCOSUR rule or
norm will naturally conclude that they have no effective mechanism to protect
their interests within the organization. They "lose" more than they gain by
488 See supra notes 111-53 and accompanying text.
489 In the case of the EU, the Commission has the right to investigate and commence
proceedings in the European Court of Justice against any member state which has violated the
Treaty of Rome. See supra notes 439-43 and accompanying text.
"9 See supra notes 154-93 and accompanying text.
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participating in MERCOSUR and abiding by its rules. A member state who,
on the other hand, chooses not to implement, or comply with, the MERCOSUR
norms may feel no obligation to do so, since there is no effective penalty for
noncompliance with community norms. The implication is clear: an interna-
tional economic organization that cannot effectively enforce compliance with
its norms and resolve disputes arising out of its operations will not be
effective. With its current dispute resolution mechanism, MERCOSUR is in
danger of becoming just that.
If MERCOSUR resolves these two problems, it will be able to continue to
substantially implement and expand its integration agenda and will be vastly
strengthened. A strong MERCOSUR will be able to attract new members and
to coexist with, or negotiate an advantageous position within, the FTAA. If the
FTAA does not come into being, then a powerful MERCOSUR could become
an economic powerhouse within the Southern Hemisphere.
